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7. Conclusion: Developing a National Narrative 
 
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, 
Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. 
All the king's horses and all the king's men 
Couldn't put Humpty together again. 
Lewis Carroll (1871) Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 
 
'Oh, I've had such a curious dream!', said Alice 
Lewis Carroll (1865) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
The key lesson from our research and discussions is that we need a national narrative on 
pensions if we are going to build a consensus around retirement income provision. The 
alternative is to live in a Tower of Babel with any sensible messages drowned out by a 
cacophony of mixed and often contradictory signals that will just confuse the majority of 
pension scheme members in the retirement phase of their lives. The dream of a 
comfortable retirement could easily turn into a nightmare. We identify five key factors that 
need to make an appropriate contribution if the objective of a national consensus is to be 
achieved: the pensions industry itself, national media, the regulatory system, the political 
system, and the pension tax system (and the implications this has for the level of pension 
savings built up prior to retirement). We make a number of recommendations that will help 
support the objective. 
7.1 Introduction 
Everything used to be clear cut when it came to the generation of retirement income from 
funded occupational pension schemes. There was an accumulation phase, a de-risking phase 
leading up to a known retirement date, at which point the member took a 25% tax-free 
lump sum and the rest as a pension or an annuity that provided a retirement income for as 
long as the member (and possibly spouse or partner) lived. If there were weaknesses and 
inefficiencies in that system, there was a case for fixing them. 
The simplest fix would have been to reduce the minimum income requirement (MIR) from 
£20,000 to a lower figure, such as £14,000.998 This would have allowed many more people 
                                                     
998
 As a comparison, the full single tier state pension coming into effect from April 2016 will be around £8,000 
(£155.65 per week). In a written statement to the House of Lords on 22 July 2015, the Pensions Minister, Ros 
Altmann, disclosed that only 37% of people would receive the full amount of new state pension in 2016. 
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to have greater flexibility over their retirement spending, while still ensuring they did not 
run out of money before they die. In two reports written in 2010, the Pensions Institute 
recommended a MIR of £14,000 (£280 per week) as being the level needed to keep people 
from claiming any means-tested benefits.999 These reports were said to have influenced 
Treasury policy, although the Treasury decided to set a much higher MIR. 
However, instead of fixing it, the Government decided to completely abandon this system 
and, in particular, the requirement to annuitise any pension assets at all. Pension schemes 
no longer need to fulfil their primary role of providing a life-long retirement income. There is 
no doubt that the new pension freedoms are very popular with pension savers. Indeed, free 
market supporters describe them as ‘inspired’.1000 It is clear the changes cannot be 
reversed.   
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the decumulation decision – the optimal 
running down of assets in retirement – is extremely complex. It involves not only pension 
assets, but also non-pension assets and decisions have to be made about inheritance, 
taxation and long term care, etc. If mistakes are made and the assets are invested unwisely 
or spent too quickly, retired people do not generally have the option to re-enter the labour 
market to earn some more money in the way that younger people do. Further, these 
decisions might have to be made in the presence of reduced mental capacity, as is the case 
with someone with dementia, for example. 
Nor does it change the fact that there are now two completely different and mutually 
inconsistent models of individual behaviour underlying the two different stages of DC 
pension schemes in the UK. In the accumulation stage, we have a model that assumes 
people are ‘humans’ and which exploits inertia and other behavioural barriers to get people 
to start saving a bit (certainly not enough) for their pensions.  In decumulation, we have the 
model of ‘econs’, rational lifecycle financial planners, fully capable of managing the 
complexities of decumulation decision making, following 45 minutes of guidance and, 
ideally, some good-valued and highly focused advice. 
Further, there is a real danger that people forget they face a lifetime budget constraint on 
what they can do. There seems to be a whole range of people who have not saved enough 
for their retirement, but still expect that their pension pot can be used to pay off pre-
                                                     
999
 David Blake, Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory Annuitisation: What are the 
Consequences?, Pensions Institute, July 
(www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences.pdf); 
David Blake, Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory Annuitisation: Quantifying the 
Consequences, Pensions Institute, September 
(www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences2.pdf) 
1000
 For example, Allister Heath (2015) Business Comment, Daily Telegraph, 18 April. 
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retirement debts, dip into whenever they like, deliver a life-long income, and also make 
bequests to their descendants. It just doesn’t add up, as many will find out in due course. 
This brings us to the issue of consumer vulnerability. This has two key dimensions. The first 
is that many consumers, through ignorance, overconfidence, arrogance or reduced mental 
capacity, do not recognise their own vulnerability. The second is that many consumers are 
open to exploitation by being sold inappropriate, over-engineered high-cost products. They 
also face overpaying for advice. Even worse, they are open to fraud and investment 
scammers. 
Making decisions about retirement income are the hardest financial decisions people ever 
have to make, because the risks in Table 1.2 are so significant and so poorly understood – 
and these risks are in addition to the importance of recognising that the pension pot cannot 
be spent twice. Getting it right requires a national narrative about what pensions are for.  
Everyone in Parliament – whatever their political affiliation – and industry has to sign up to 
this narrative, just as they did with auto-enrolment. If not, we will end up living in a Tower 
of Babel, with no signal and just a lot of noise, with a different narrative for each retiree.  
This cannot possibly be in the best interests of most retirees, especially the most vulnerable, 
since it will almost inevitably lead to poor outcomes and high charges. Anyone who seriously 
objects to this either believes in an unrealistic model of human behaviour or is pursuing a 
vested interest. We know that a national narrative works in other countries, e.g., Holland, 
where there is an accepted national narrative based on social solidarity between social 
partners. We also know that it can also happen in the UK, if only temporarily, as in the case 
of the consensus built around the Pensions Commission’s reports in 2004-05.  
So what can be done to help establish a national narrative and build a consensus around 
retirement income provision? Each of the following need to make an appropriate 
contribution: 
 The pensions industry 
 The national media 
 The regulatory system 
 The political system  
 The pension tax system and the level of pension savings. 
7.2 Contributing to a national narrative 1: The pensions industry 
The first contribution needs to come from the pensions industry itself. This broadly 
comprises four key groups of agents: providers, advisers, investment managers and insurers. 
All are important for delivering the best products and services for pension savers in the new 
world of ‘freedom and choice’. However, it is clear from our analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 
that there are serious fissures in the relationships between these four groups, in particular, 
between investment managers and insurers – who are fighting a turf war over the control of 
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pension assets in decumulation – and between providers and advisers – who are fighting a 
turf war over access to clients. Yet all these parties are needed to provide appropriate, 
effective and good-valued retirement income solutions.   
Well-designed retirement income solutions have both an investment component – to 
provide stable inflation-adjusted returns and flexibility over withdrawals – and an insurance 
component – to provide a longevity hedge. But the products sold by investment managers 
do not have a longevity hedge and the products sold by insurers, while offering the 
necessary longevity protection, have low returns and little flexibility. But at present, there is 
no clear agreement on what an optimal retirement income solution might look like. There is 
no effective collaboration between investment managers and insurers in designing products 
that can be combined to provide solutions that offer both spending flexibility and protection 
against inflation and longevity risk. 1001  Similarly, there is no agreement on what a 
reasonable charge for this solution should be. We are just told that market forces will sort 
this out. 
Further, parts of the industry, especially the insurance industry, have not in the past treated 
their customers fairly, as they are supposed to do. We were told by an industry insider that 
‘the insurance industry has a lot to answer for’ and cited a 2008 Financial Services Authority 
study which reported an example of a company that said that the ABI code was a threat to 
its business model since it wanted to maximise internal annuity sales – rather than have its 
customers use the open market option – and gave bonuses to sales staff for doing so. The 
insider also went on to say ‘if people make mistakes, this actually profits the industry, so 
what incentive does the industry have to stop this?’ Clearly, this type of attitude by key 
players in an industry with many vulnerable consumers is not acceptable. Customers are 
told that they will be treated fairly and industry business practices must be consistent with 
this. 
There is also a lot of thinly disguised hostility between providers and advisers concerning 
the appropriate level of advice for different market segments, how it should be delivered, 
the appropriate pricing model for advice in the different segments, and even about who 
should give that advice. Providers want to be able to give advice to scheme members. While 
this is allowed under US regulations and welcomed by US employers, it is frowned upon in 
the UK by advisers and regulators as not being ‘independent’. In turn, advisers who are in 
the process of rebranding themselves as wealth managers believe that they can advise on 
and put in place retirement income and inheritance solutions for their clients without 
involving providers.  
These divisions have been long standing and are, in part, the result of normal competitive 
pressures, compounded by the fact that most pension savers are disengaged from the 
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 The NEST blueprint discussed in Chapter 5 is a notable exception. 
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pension saving process, do not understand the risks that they face, and are generally not 
skilled enough to exercise their sovereign rights as consumers to demand that producers 
and advisers provide them with the best designed and the best valued products and 
services. 
On top of this, we need to recognise that professional services firms are prone to over-
service their clients to build up fee and those operating in financial services are no different. 
There are some in the financial services industry who believe that there should be a tailor-
made plan for every retiree. But, as we discussed in Chapter 3, this is an example of the 
‘interior decorator fallacy’, namely the idea that retirement income strategies should be 
designed to reflect attitudes to, say, risk in the same way that interior decorators attempt to 
reflect the personal taste of their clients. 1002 For all but the most affluent, such a tailor-
made plan would be far too expensive. We accept that one size doesn’t fit all, but then 
neither does a bespoke plan with annual reviews for someone with a £50,000 pension pot 
when the charge is 0.75% p.a. Something much more simple and focused is required. If 
anyone is thinking of questioning this, they should remind themselves that the new single-
tier pension has a capitalised value of around £200,000 and no one appears to be setting up 
shop to advise pensioners how to spend their state pension. 
Looking forward, the pensions industry is just not going to be able to get away with how it 
has traditionally operated. Instead, the industry is going to have to work together to offer 
the best designed and the best valued products and services and show clearly how these fit 
in to the retirement journey of their clients. Commercial airlines have to do this for their 
customers, so why shouldn’t those involved in the provision of retirement incomes? In 
addition, there needs to be much greater clarity over charges and fees. The full set of 
charges incurred in delivering a product should be made clear to customers. In terms of 
adviser fees, there needs to be much greater justification of ad valorem fees where the fee 
is unrelated to the amount of work done. Such fees are now very uncommon in most other 
types of professional services organisations. 
‘Freedom and choice’ could be a disaster if these matters are not addressed. The particular 
segment of the market most at risk is mass market DC customers with pension assets 
between £30,000 and £100,000. Such consumers are unlikely to pay for full regulated advice 
and are therefore at risk of buying expensive, poorly designed products on a non-advised 
basis. Those with pension assets below £30,000 are likely to have most of their retirement 
expenditure needs met by the state pension and by welfare benefits – they will welcome 
the extra flexibilities that the new pension regime offers in terms of how they spend their 
pension pot. Those with pension assets above £100,000 are more likely to see the value of 
seeking advice. 
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 See Peter Bernstein (1992) Capital Ideas, Free Press, New York. 
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The simplest solution to the problem facing the market segment most at risk is a safe 
harbour retirement income plan which combines: 
 A simple decision tree and a limited set of default pathways 
 Safe harbour products that deliver income flexibility as well as inflation and longevity 
protection, meet minimum design standards in terms of efficacy, and deliver clear 
value for money 
 Financial help, most probably delivered over the internet. 
If between them, providers, advisers, investment managers and insurers, are unable to 
deliver this solution, then we would regard this as considerably more serious than the 
market failure – the absence of voluntary pension savings by up 9 million employees in 
companies without a pension scheme – that the Pensions Commission was set up to 
investigate and resolve – via the introduction of auto-enrolment.  
The resolution to this new potential market failure would be a national master trust 
drawdown scheme that has a public service obligation to accept any DC retiree, irrespective 
of their pot size. This might be a simple continuation of NEST's public service obligation to 
accept any employer for accumulation (if EU regulations permit). 
Some industry practitioners are aware of the consequences of the industry getting it wrong. 
For example, Phil Loney, chief executive of Royal London, has said: ‘George Osborne's 
pension reforms have the potential to become famous for helping people to improve their 
retirement incomes, but without plentiful and affordable financial advice they risk becoming 
an infamous example of political bungling. The reforms have been introduced too quickly 
and the population had so far failed to understand what it means for them. I fear that many 
will make the wrong, often irrecoverable decisions about their retirement and this will result 
in some very poor outcomes. The simple fact is that many people, perhaps most, have not 
engaged with pension freedom and lack the basic financial knowledge to take the next 
steps’.1003  
7.3 Contributing to a national narrative 2: The national media 
The second contribution needs to come from the national media. As Aileen Lynch, head of 
technical services at Compliance First, has written ‘There’s an unsettling dichotomy 
between the messages of the mainstream media (“This is your money and you are entitled 
to do with it whatever you want, whenever you please”) and the more considered, long-
                                                     
1003 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Pensions freedom risks becoming ‘infamous example of political 
bungling’ – Royal London, Professional Adviser, 12 February. 
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term approach which is generally prevalent in financial services press and among advisers 
and providers’.1004  
The national media has a very important role to play in getting the right message across 
about the real purpose of a pension scheme and the genuine risks that retirees face – much 
more now than in the days of final salary pensions when people received a life-long indexed 
pension and did not have to worry about the risks in Table 1.2.  
However, there are two potentially significant long-term conseqences of the ‘this is your 
money’ view of a pension pot currently prevailing in the national media. The first is a 
potential moral hazard. If a sufficiently large number of people behave in a reckless way and 
withdraw all their money and spend it too quickly, then they could claim compensation for 
mis-selling. Further, they will also demand an increase in welfare benefits and that, in turn, 
could lead to inter-generational conflict, with the next generation of taxpayers refusing to 
bail out their profligate and reckless predecessors. The second is the focus on reducing 
inheritance tax for those already sufficiently well off that, when they die, they will leave 
significant assets in their pension pot. Ordinary tax payers will soon start asking why they 
should subsidise the transfer of tax-priviledged assets across generations of already wealthy 
families. The whole rationale for having tax incentives to encourage pension savings would 
soon come into question. 
7.4 Contributing to a national narrative 3: The regulatory system 
Our research has highlighted a number of problems with the current dual regulatory system, 
whereby The Pensions Regulator (TPR) regulates trust-based schemes and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) regulates contract-based schemes. Not only does this lead to 
inconsistencies in regulation, the two organisations have two different narratives. As a 
pension lawyer told us: ‘The FCA looks at products and providers. It has individual customer 
protection as its focus. TPR is concerned more about giving guidance to trustees and 
employers at the level of the scheme’.  See Table 7.1  for more details of the differences.  
 
Table 7.1:  Respective Strengths of the contract and trust-based regimes 
Activity Contract-based regime (FCA) Trust-based regime (TPR) 
Rigour of regulatory 
regime 
Requirement to meet threshold 
conditions to conduct regulated 
activities.  Ongoing monitoring 
including: 
 Supervision 
 Thematic reviews 
It relies on trustees and other 
professionals to report any 
breaches and to comply with 
their statutory whistleblowing 
duties. 
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 Quoted in Aileen Lynch (2015) Handle with care: Dealing with insistent clients safely, Retirement Planner, 
18 November. 
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Communication with 
members 
Requirement for 
communications that reflect 
where individuals are on the 
retirement journey. 
 
Prescriptive around the 
information provided to 
members – in some cases, this 
may make it more difficult for 
organisations to present 
information in the most useful 
way (e.g., if they are required to 
provide information that will not 
be used by the member). 
Schemes able to tailor their 
communications to their 
members. 
 
Communications may be 
designed at the level of the 
scheme membership and may 
not reflect an individual’s 
position on their retirement 
journey. 
Compatibility with 
workplace pensions 
Employees do not typically have a choice of pension scheme, this is 
down to the employer 
FCA’s requirement to promote 
consumer choice of their 
pension provider is not as 
relevant under automatic 
enrolment where it is the 
employer who chooses the 
pension scheme. 
 
This suggests that some of the 
information, such as the 
provision of information to help 
members make choices) 
provided, may not be used and 
that this may distract members 
from other important 
information. 
Schemes have the leeway to 
provide information relevant to 
the members’ situation – that 
can reflect the fact that the 
employer chooses pension 
schemes under automatic 
enrolment. 
Activity Contract-based regime (FCA) Trust based regime (TPR) 
Cost (including 
monetary costs and 
time) of managing 
pension schemes 
Compliance entails a higher 
volume of work and cost than 
required by the trust-based 
regime. 
 
Pension providers must receive 
authorisation for certain 
activities. 
Compliance requires lower 
volume of work – for example, 
lower levels of contact with the 
regulator. 
 
Trustees have the freedom to 
make decisions if they judge 
these to be beneficial to 
members. 
Source: Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015, Table A) Comparison of the Regulatory Frameworks for DC 
Pensions, Pensions Policy Institute, October. 
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Problems that have been identified with the current system include the following:1005 
 TPR and the FCA constantly need to consult one another on a range of activities. 
According to Malcolm McLean, senior consultant at Barnett Waddingham: ‘This is 
not only inefficient it is positively dangerous…With both auto-enrolment and the 
pensions freedom at critical stages of development, it makes no sense to proceed as 
we are. …A single regulator would be less confusing for consumers, would help to 
plug gaps in the current arrangements and provide greater consistency of treatment 
between trust-based and contract-based schemes…[It would also] provide a clear 
focus for direct action and early intervention where necessary’1006  
 The two regulators are regulating very similar products for very similar consumers, 
but there are different protections for both. One example is the different 
approaches to retirement risk warnings.1007 In January 2015, the FCA said that 
providers of contract-based DC schemes should issue tailored risk warnings that 
depended on an individual’s circumstances assessed via a list of 11 questions to 
ensure consumers make well-informed decisions. By contrast, TPR encourages 
trustees to provide only generic risk warnings to scheme members and to direct 
them to Pension Wise 
 Another example relates to a confusion in the proposed rules on transferring from 
DB to DC schemes when there are benefits with guaranteed annuity rates (GARs). 
The FCA states that a GAR turns a money purchase scheme into a safeguarded 
benefit, which means members with a GAR will need to take advice if they want to 
transfer. However, TPR defines a GAR as a money purchase benefit until it is taken, 
which means there should be no requirement for trustees to ensure advice is taken. 
 There is also potential confusion when it comes to compensation. On the surface, 
everything appears to be clear-cut. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
covers 100% of the value of an annuity in the event that the insurance company 
providing the annuity defaults, £75,000 of the value of bank deposits, and £50,000 of 
the value of retirement and investment savings. But this compensation applies to 
individuals not to schemes and also depends on whether the FSCS treats the pension 
pot as an investment or a long-term insurance arrangement: 
                                                     
1005
 Some of these come from our interview panels. 
1006 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) MPs push for single pensions regulator to protect post-freedom retirees, 
Professional Adviser, 10 March. 
1007
 ‘While both regulators have identified similar types of risk, their approaches are different with TPR 
focusing on enablement and education. It is also less prescriptive than the FCA in terms of its guidance, 
particularly around communication to pension savers. In contrast, the FCA is more pro-active in monitoring 
pension schemes’ activities. This difference reflects the fact that it is the trustees who are responsible for 
playing a supervisory role in the trust-based regime’ (Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015) Comparison of 
the Regulatory Frameworks for DC Pensions, Pensions Policy Institute, October). 
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o For example, if a trust-based scheme invests via an insurance company, there 
are cases where it will not be covered by the FSCS. To illustrate from 
Standard Life’s Trust-based Pension Plan Key Features document: ‘Your plan 
is classed as a long-term contract of insurance. The trustees will be eligible 
for compensation under the FSCS if Standard Life Assurance Ltd (SLAL) 
becomes unable to meet its claims and the cover is 100% of the value of their 
claim. If your plan is invested in one of our funds that invests in a mutual fund 
run by another firm (including Standard Life Investments Ltd), the trustees 
are not eligible for any compensation under the FSCS if that firm is unable to 
meet its claims. SLAL is not able to make a claim on the trustees behalf, so 
the price of a unit in our fund will depend on the amount we recover from 
the firm. If your plan is invested in one of our funds that invests in a fund run 
by another insurer, the trustees are not eligible for any compensation under 
the FSCS if that insurer is unable to meet its claims. SLAL is not able to make a 
claim on the trustees behalf’.1008 
o Similarly, with a self-invested personal pension scheme. A SIPP comes under 
the FCA because it is contract-based, but if it is not set up as a life office 
wrapped product, the FSCS treats it as a pure investment which has a lower 
level of compensation. 
 While it is very unlikely that a UK life office will become insolvent, the same cannot 
be said of the plethora of small master trusts that have emerged following the 
introduction of auto-enrolment. The entry and capital adequacy requirements for 
master trusts have been described to us as ‘derisory’.1009 While compensation for 
trust-based schemes comes under The Pensions Regulator and its compensation 
scheme, the Pension Protection Fund (which also runs another compensation 
scheme for cases of fraud, the Fraud Compensation Fund),1010 this has not yet been 
seriously tested in the new world of auto-enrolment. NEST has its own separate 
regulations which again do not necessarily give full protection to members: ‘Because 
NEST has been set up as a trust, our members are the owners of all the assets we 
hold on their behalf. If anything goes wrong their retirement pots remain their 
property. Member funds are not fully covered by the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme. However, we invest some of our member’s assets in 
contracts of insurance which are covered by the FSCS in certain circumstances’.1011 
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 http://library.standardlife.com/tbp17.pdf 
1009
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a0eabc40-732c-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc.html#axzz40EwqWETE 
1010
 https://www.gov.uk/workplace-pensions/protection-for-your-pension 
1011
  
http://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/docs/selecting-a-good-quality-
pension-scheme,PDF.pdf 
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 Rajiv Jaitly states: 1012  
 
‘..[I]t can be argued that multiple regulators weaken their regulatory 
reach. They are weakened because differences in objectives, functions and 
powers of  enforcement between them create loopholes. The need for 
liaison between them creates bureaucracy and delay. These weaknesses 
create the potential for regulatory arbitrage. For example, three regulators 
police DC pension schemes and the financial services firms that provide 
investment funds for them: the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Pensions Regulator (TPR). Each 
regulator has different powers in terms of intervention and fines. In 
particular, while the FCA and TPR share the role of regulating DC pensions, 
the former appears to have much wider powers than the latter. Despite the 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the FCA and TPR in 
relation to DC pensions, this asymmetry in power might tempt providers of 
automatic enrolment pension schemes to ‘choose’ what they perceive as a 
‘regulation light’ ‘trust’ structure regulated by TPR rather than the FCA. 
Furthermore, the level of fines the regulators can impose – even by the FCA 
– might not be considered punitive by firms. With regulators having to 
abide by principles of proportionality, fines may be treated as no more 
than ‘the cost of doing business. 
 
Retail investors who wish to challenge a firm’s behaviour face a confusing 
process because the three regulators do not normally deal with consumer 
complaints. Complaints about firms regulated by the FCA are directed to 
the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), while those about pension 
schemes regulated by TPR go to the Pensions Ombudsman. There is also a 
grey area of overlap between them, for example in the case of transfers of 
members’ money from defined benefit (DB) schemes to DC arrangements. 
The jurisdiction of compensation schemes such as the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) and the Fraud Compensation Scheme (FCS) is 
also confusing. 
 
It may of course be possible to challenge an investment management 
contract through the courts, but the options are limited due to the way 
contracts are structured and shortcomings in the legislation on unfair 
contract terms. 
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  Rajiv Jaitly (2014) Collective Investment Schemes - Costs and Charges - Implications For Consumers - A 
Report For The Financial Services Consumer Panel; https://Www.Fs-
Cp.Org.Uk/Sites/Default/Files/Investment_Jaitly_Final_Report_Full_Report.Pdf 
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The following is a sample of the comments of those we interviewed: 
 ‘The contract based-regime prioritises shareholder interests over savers’ interests, 
whereas the trust-based regime gives absolute priority to savers. The FCA’s 
regulatory duties are structured so that any attempt to move away from relying on 
information and competition only to remedy market failures would be crippled by 
judicial review, so it repeatedly fails to do anything useful in the pension space. The 
FCA is captured by the industry in a way TPR is not. The FCA does not want to do 
anything, whereas TPR culturally would like to in intervene if it was given more 
powers’. 
 ‘The failings at the FCA were exposed on 17 December 2014 at the Work and 
Pensions Select Committee where they unwisely said “you cannot stop fools acting 
like fools”. The committee said this was an abdication of responsibility. The FCA are 
supposed to enforce TCF [treating customers fairly], but their own analysis showed 
that they were not doing this, e.g., they were aware that bonuses in insurance 
companies were linked to increases in internal annuity sales. The FCA finally listened 
on 17 December and rushed in the “second line of defence” [now called “additional 
protection”]. This move followed calls by a range of consumer organisations and 
providers including [our company], as noted in the Work and Pension Select 
Committee report’. 
 ‘The FCA is sometimes too prescriptive and sometimes not bold enough, e.g., it was 
forced by industry to bring in the emergency “second line of defence”’. 
 ‘The FCA needs to give providers more leeway’. 
 ‘TPR is all at sea and well behind the curve’. 
 ‘There is inconsistent and conflicting decision making at the EU level, e.g., between 
the European Parliament, the European Commission and EIOPA’. 
According to Darren Philp, head of policy and market engagement at The People’s Pension: 
‘We need to have more joined up policymaking to ensure no matter what pension scheme 
you’re saving in, you get the appropriate level of protections and avoid confusing messages 
and a confusing regulatory landscape’.1013 A similar view is held by Stephen Lowe, director 
at Just Retirement: ‘Many retirees have a combination of trust-based occupational and 
personal pension plans, so the rules needed to straddle both regimes in order to ensure 
clarity and consistency. It's in the interests of the consumers, the regulators and the 
industry that we avoid the problems caused by trying to operate a two-tier system’.1014 
                                                     
1013 Reported in Luisa Porritt (2015) Trustee briefing - Retirement risk warnings, Engaged Investor, 2 April. 
1014 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Government drops mandatory advice for small DB transfers, 
Professional Pensions, 27 January. 
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Martin Wheatley, then chief executive of the FCA, said he could ‘sympathise’ with the 
industry’s frustration over the twin regulatory regime. He accepted that ‘There are two sets 
of decision-makers putting out slightly different views. We are clear it must be tailored 
without being advice. TPR hasn't given that kind of precision’. He agreed that it was 
important to have ‘reasonably common standard delivery’ and argued for the same 
definition of guidance to protect people from receiving mixed messages. He also said that 
moving to a single regulator was a decision for policy makers.1015 
According to those we interviewed, the current fragmented regulatory system fails to 
encourage the design of effective, value-for-money products and solutions with a safe-
harbour status or to adequately protect consumers from mis-selling and fraud. The solution 
would be to have a single pensions regulator, specifically tasked with these responsibilities.  
It would also have a responsibility for trying to change regulations which contribute to bad 
outcomes. As an example, we were told that prudential regulations in the UK increase the 
cost of prudential capital and reduce the value of annuities by 20% compared with the US. 
Another example is EU regulations, particularly MiFID II. If drawdown is reclassified as 
complex under MiFID II, it is likely that only those with large pots (above £100,000) who can 
afford regulated advice will be able to buy the product. What will mass market consumers 
who want to use drawdown do in these circumstances? 
The idea of a single regulator is supported by the Work and Pensions Select Committee in its 
report Progress with Automatic Enrolment and Pension Reforms published in March 
2015.1016  The report said that the potential increased risk to pension savers from mis-selling 
and fraud following the introduction of the new pension flexibilities from April 2015 
strengthens the case for combining the regulators. 
Dame Anne Begg MP, Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee at the time, said: 
The new pension flexibilities give savers the freedom to use their money in 
the way they choose and have the potential to make retirement saving 
really attractive. But savers need to be properly protected from being 
ripped off in frauds or scams, or suffering financial loss from making the 
wrong decision about how to use their pension pots. The pensions industry 
has not always done enough in the past to help savers make the right 
decisions.  
What savers really need is a strong, single regulator to act in their 
interests. We are not convinced that the FCA is sufficiently focused on 
pensions. The comment made in evidence to us that it can’t ‘stop fools 
                                                     
1015 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) FCA ‘sympathises’ with frustration over twin pensions regulation, 
Professional Pensions, 12 March.  
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 Fourth Report from the Work and Pensions Committee: Progress with Automatic Enrolment and Pension 
Reforms, HC 668; 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/668/668.pdf 
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acting like fools’ does not inspire confidence in the FCA’s willingness to be 
proactive in protecting savers. The Government is coming round to our 
way of thinking about the need for a single regulator. We believe that the 
big shift to the new pension flexibilities in April means that it is now time to 
make this change, which we originally recommended back in 2013. 
 
The report said a single regulator would have a clear focus on the entire retirement saving 
process: ‘Savers would have clarity on who was responsible for providing guidance and 
redress, and employers and the pensions industry would have a single body to advise and 
supervise them’.  
Nevertheless, combining the regulators would not be straightforward as pointed out by 
Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015), due to, e.g., the volume of contract, tax, trust 
and pension law needing to be changed to accommodate a move to a single regulator; and 
it is not clear where a single regulator should sit – whether this would be in the Department 
for Work and Pensions or Her Majesty’s Treasury.1017 
7.5 Contributing to a national narrative 4: The political system 
The fourth contribution needs to come from the political system. It is increasingly clear that 
the five-year political business cycle is not suited to dealing with long-term issues like 
pensions, long-term care and long-term savings. Political parties, whether in power or in 
opposition, are totally focused on winning the next election and appear unable to think 
beyond that. It is therefore very hard to get any political party to adopt sensible long-term 
solutions to the problems of pensions, long-term care and long-term savings, especially if 
this involves sacrifices today, because it fears this would benefit its political opponents who 
could well be in power when the benefits begin to show.  
This has fundamental consequences for intergenerational equity, since every generation 
passes the consequences of its own failures down to the next generation. While this can be 
a small problem when a population is growing, it becomes very severe when a population is 
rapidly ageing. To illustrate, a key reason why we would want each generation to hedge its 
own exposure to longevity risk is that, if it fails to do so, it is expecting the next generation 
to provide that hedge for free. The main objection to buying annuities – the classic longevity 
hedge –  by the baby boom generation currently retiring is that they are ‘too expensive’. But 
they will be even more expensive for the next generation to provide if significant numbers 
of baby boomers run out of money and demand that the next generation provides them 
with an income for life (aka an annuity) to keep them out of ‘poverty’. For how much longer 
can the baby boom generation keep asking for a free lunch from the next? 
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 Melissa Echalier and Sarah Luheshi (2015) Comparison of the Regulatory Frameworks for DC Pensions, 
Pensions Policy Institute, October. 
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One way of achieving a national narrative as well as dealing with the myopia of the political 
business cycle is to have a permanent Pensions, Care and Savings Commission (PCSC). This 
would be an independent body that would have cross-party support and would make 
recommendations on issues relating to pensions, long-term care and long-term savings. The 
PCSC would require an evidence basis for any policy recommendations, together with an 
impact and risk assessment. A particularly important role for the PCSC would be to ensure 
inter-generational equity.1018 Since no generation can, during its working life, store for its 
retirement the goods and services it will consume in retirement, each generation depends 
on the next generation to provide those goods and services in a way that is not widely 
recognised.  Models for how the PCSC might operate are the Low Pay Commission (LPC), the 
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), and the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC).1019 The PCSC would report directly to Parliament. 
There is widespread support for such a commission and we consider some examples. 
The Work and Pensions Select Committee report Progress with Automatic Enrolment and 
Pension Reforms cited earlier also called for an independent pension commission to build 
public confidence and long-term stability in the system.1020  The commission would look at 
the following issues:  
 To assess the impact of the Budget flexibilities on default investment strategies 
 To consider whether a default decumulation option is required for savers making 
poor decisions 
 To assess the impact of the reforms on the suitability and accessibility of retirement 
products 
 To recommend market interventions where the market was not working in savers’ 
best interest 
 To tackle high charges and poor governance in legacy schemes 
 To review auto-enrolment, including making recommendations on minimum 
contributions and defining adequacy of retirement income and how the policy 
should be assessed as a success. The report said using opt-out rates to measure 
success would not be meaningful in the long term 
 To oversee any further changes in savings and tax policy 
                                                     
1018
 In January 2016, the Work and Pensions Select Committee launched an inquiry into ‘inter-generational 
fairness’ over concerns that the state pension and welfare system is unfairly favouring pensioners at the 
expense of younger workers (http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/work-and-pensions-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/intergenerational-fairness-15-16/). 
1019 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/about/. For a risk assessment report which includes a chapter on Ethics by 
Lord Rees (pp 134-136), see http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/projects/climate-change-risk-assessment/ 
1020
 Fourth Report from the Work and Pensions Committee: Progress with Automatic Enrolment and Pension 
Reforms, HC 668; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/668/668.pdf 
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 To assess the minimum age at which people can exercise their pension flexibilities. 
The current age is 55 and this will rise to 57 in 2028 when the state pension age 
increases to 67. But allowing people to draw on the private pension ten years before 
state pension age could create unrealistic expectations about the age at which they 
can afford to stop working. The commission  would consider whether this should be 
reduced to five years, except for those in ill health 
 To look at issues relating to auto-enrolment: the challenges of extending AE to 
smaller employers, the level of minimum contributions for employers and 
employees, and how currently excluded groups, such as the self-employed and those 
in multiple low-paid jobs, can be brought into pension saving more effectively. 
Dame Anne Begg MP said: 
The scale and pace of recent changes in pensions policy have completely 
changed the retirement saving landscape. It is necessary to draw breath 
and review the extent of the changes and their implications.  
A new independent pension commission would be able to identify any 
emerging risks, and explore with stakeholders how these can best be 
addressed. The Turner Commission brought political consensus, full 
involvement of stakeholders, and detailed consideration of the wider 
impacts of major pensions policy changes. The successful introduction of 
auto-enrolment is a product of this. The current reforms have not always 
benefited from the same careful approach. A new commission is now 
needed to provide coherence in pensions policy and to build public 
confidence and long-term stability in the system. 
 
Also in March 2015, the Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) released a seven-point 
Retirement Income Manifesto.1021 The ACA wants the Government to establish a long-term 
consensus by setting up and taking regular advice from a new standing Independent 
Retirement Income Commission. This would be charged with ‘promoting the active 
extension and betterment of private retirement income provision and making 
recommendations on the future of state and public sector retirement provision’. 
The ACA proposed the following remit for the Independent Retirement Income Commission: 
 To review the structure of state pensions and the Government’s timetable for raising 
the state retirement age to reflect both improvements in life-spans and overall 
financial costs to the taxpayer (given the current commitment to the ‘triple lock’ 
indexation of the basic state pension)  
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 www.aca.org.uk/files/ACA_issues_Retirement_Income_manifesto-12_March_2015-20150312125512.pdf 
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 To advise every three years on the need or not for a general increase in retirement 
age to reflect increases in longevity so as to keep pension funding costs broadly 
stable over the long-term where scheme specific information is unavailable  
 To recommend policies designed to encourage more employers and employees to 
invest in retirement income plans, including auto-escalation and other measures to 
maximise design flexibilities and choices, advising on financial and tax incentives to 
encourage wider coverage, whilst taking account of the UK economic, demographic 
and financial backcloth and life-style changes  
 To review and make recommendations on tax incentives for long-term care products  
 To promote legislative and regulatory simplification to encourage quality provision, 
accepting that legislation must continue to protect members’ retirement incomes 
from the impact of employer or provider insolvency or default  
 At the request of Government, to review on a periodic basis the structure and rules 
of the NEST scheme to ensure employees are offered an appropriate fall-back 
retirement income plan where no better scheme is offered by a sponsoring 
employer  
 To ensure that over the long-term, the cost of public sector pensions, and those that 
are largely funded by the taxpayer, are transparent in cost to the taxpayer, are 
sustainable and are fair set against the scale of private provision available to the 
majority of taxpayers  
 To report (within 6 months) on matters referred by Government to the Commission 
on an ad hoc basis and also on European directives that could have an impact on any 
of the above.  
In June 2015, David Fairs, Chairman of the ACA, renewed the association’s call for an 
Independent Commission which ‘would help support joined-up decision making and we 
hope the new Pensions Minister, Baroness Altmann, and the new Economic Secretary, 
Harriett Baldwin MP, might persuade their colleagues that such a step would improve the 
long-term success of these fundamental pension reforms’.1022   
In a report published in April 2015 called The Case for an Independent Retirement Savings 
Commission, the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) call for an independent retirement 
savings commission.1023 The NAPF sponsored a national survey1024 which showed that ‘an 
                                                     
1022 ACA says pressures on pension system underscores need for an independent commission and tax 
pause, press release, 11 June 2015. 
1023 NAPF, ABI, and TUC jointly call for an Independent Retirement Savings Commission, NAPF press release, 
30 April 2015. 
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overwhelming majority of people (84%) agreed that an independent commission should be 
set up by a future Government and a similar proportion said it should be politically neutral 
(85%), impartial in its recommendations to Government (85%), and should focus not just on 
pensions, but include the wider range of issues that affect both when people retire and the 
kind of retirement they have (87%). Eight in ten (83%) were in favour of a permanent 
commission – one that would last more than one parliamentary term, would endure 
through future political cycles and provide independent, expert advice to all future UK 
Governments, regardless of their political make-up’.  
Joanne Segars, chief executive of the NAPF, said: ‘Today’s report shows the breadth and 
depth of support that exists for creating an independent retirement savings commission. A 
new standing commission will help make sure the long-term interests of savers, not the 
short-term interests of politicians, are at the heart of pensions policy. That matters because 
someone starting work today will see eight or nine General Elections before they start to 
draw their pension – eight or nine potential swings of the pensions policy pendulum which 
will do little to build saver confidence. This support for a standing commission stretches well 
beyond the people who work in pensions to the everyday savers who will rely on their 
pensions for a decent income in retirement. The idea of such a commission is not a new one 
but it has yet to become a reality – our report shows there is growing chorus for that to 
change, and soon’.  
She continued: ‘We need to go back to first principles and agree a collective vision for what 
a good retirement savings system looks like for the long-term’. She also argued that the 
success of the original Pensions Commission, chaired by Lord Turner, built on:  
 A shared understanding of the problem, namely that voluntarism meant too few 
people saving enough for old age 
 A shared building of the policy solution – and a collective vision of what needed to 
change. 
 A shared responsibility for the delivery and success of that solution – not just that 
the delivery of automatic enrolment should be shared between private sector and 
Government, but more importantly the shared acknowledgement that automatic 
enrolment could not fail. 
She ended by saying that: ‘The Commission’s process of decision making – thoughtful, 
evidence-based and inclusive – laid the foundations for a consensus which has delivered one 
of the most far-reaching public policy interventions in recent decades across any part of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
1024 Populus surveyed 1,015 adults aged over 18 in the UK online between 31 March and 2 April 2015. Data 
were weighted to be demographically representative of all adults in the UK. 
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Government. It is now unthinkable that any Government of any colour (or colours) would 
undo automatic enrolment, or that the social partners or industry would peel away from its 
core tenets. It is a part of the pensions landscape that is here to stay’.  
Further support comes from: 
 The International Longevity Centre – UK which published a report in February 2015 
called Consensus Revisited in which it called for a pension commission ‘divorced from 
the trappings of Government’ to rebuild consensus-based policy making in pensions 
and, in particular, deal with the challenge of inadequate incomes in retirement.  The 
commission would concentrate on three issues:  
o Defining target outcomes for retirement savings and extending working lives 
o Monitor progress against these targets 
o Consult on its findings and decide if there needs to be a policy update. 
 The Savings and Investments Policy Project, managed by the Tax Incentivised Savings 
Association (TISA), published a report called Our Financial Future in March 2015, 
which recommended that the Government create a 'savings minister' with the 
responsibility for promoting savings initiatives, consumer guidance and financial 
education.  
 Age UK has also called for an independent retirement savings commission was 
needed. Jane Vass, head of public policy, said: ‘There is debate over the exact form it 
should take, but it needs to be independent and it needs to look at pensions in the 
round – including state pensions, private saving and retirement income’.1025  
 Pensions Age’s Unchaining Pensions from Politics (UPP) campaign. Supporters of the 
campaign ‘wanted the commission to recommend long-term policies as a “road-
map” to future pension development, taking into account the country’s 
demographics and the needs of different generations. It should also establish what a 
“good” target outcome is for retirement saving and therefore provide savers with 
confidence. The commission should scrutinise and suggest proposals to change 
legislation. Suggestions were also made to expand its role and provide greater clarity 
of the interaction between retirement and health care needs, along with promoting 
flexible retirement and flexible working to manage the transitions from work to non-
work/less work’. Jackie Wells, NAPF head of policy and research, said: ‘The 
commission would be a purely advisory body, not a policy-making vehicle, and would 
make recommendations to Government based on independent, collaborative 
analysis of the best available evidence, which the Government would be free to 
reject. Ultimately, the aim of the commission would be to help future Governments 
                                                     
1025 Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015) Independent pensions commission demanded by July, Professional 
Adviser, 10 March.  
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ensure that policy decisions have the needs of savers – including their 
constituents’.1026 
 Respondents to the Consultation Paper: 
o There was strong support from 82% of respondents for a permanent 
pensions commission in some form or another. Only 9% were opposed to a 
pensions commission. 
 All the groups that we interviewed: 
o Providers and investment managers. While it is accepted that ministers must 
make final choices, especially if taxation is involved, all proposals should have 
been developed and examined in a measured and structured way. Examples 
of poor decisions that need to be avoided in future include: (a) the 2014 
Budget, (b) the introduction of a charge cap half way through the auto-
enrolment process, and (c) the political parties salami slicing the existing tax 
system (e.g., the Labour Party’s proposals in the 2015 General Election to 
transfer resources to lowering student fees). There are some important 
issues that the Pensions Commission could deal with: 
 The current fragmentation of decision making in Government with 
HM Treasury (in relation to tax), the DWP and the Health Department 
all having a say. 
o Trade unions: 
 ‘With some of the changes of the last few years, it would have been 
very helpful to have an independent commission opining on it. There 
is merit in ensuring it is statutory, as well as having a definite remit 
and an independence of its own’. 
 ‘Charges, contributions rates, the statutory retirement age. What is a 
sensible draw down rate? There could be quite a few things it could 
do. Look at what are the right contribution levels. Everyone knows 
they should be higher’. 
 ‘It could look at predicted long-term investment growth. It could 
provide a recommended amount of drawdown. You have got life 
expectancies and investment growth from a portfolio. You could say 
the recommended amount you can take out is £X. The problem with 
                                                     
1026
 Reported in Laura Blows (2015)  Industry concerned politicians would ‘sabotage’ an independent pensions 
commission, Pensions Age, 28 April. See also Laura Blows (2015)  Open letters sent to DWP and Treasury 
calling for independent pensions commission, Pensions Age, 2 June. The letters were signed by: Mike Allen, 
Director of Pensions, LPFA; Laura Blows, Editor, Pensions Age; Emma Douglas, Head of DC Distribution, LGIM; 
Dame Karen Dunnell, Chair, Longevity Science Panel (Legal & General); David Fairs, Chairman, ACA; Ammo 
Kambo, Charted Financial Planner; Kevin LeGrand, Head of Pensions Policy, Buck Consultants at Xerox; Ronnie 
Morgan, Strategic Market Insight Manager, Royal London; Darren Philp; Alan Pickering, Chairman, 
BESTrustees; Carolyn Saunders, Head of Pensions, Pinsent Masons; Rachel Vahey, Independent Consultant; 
and Jackie Wells, Head of Policy and Research, NAPF. 
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drawdown is the impact of the first five or six years is a big 
determinant of future years’. 
 However, the model proposed for the Pensions Commission in the 
consultation paper – along the lines of the MPC – was not welcomed: 
 ‘I do not think the MPC would be a very good model. You 
could have a Pensions Commission that makes big public 
recommendations to Government and hard for them to 
ignore. The Low Pay Commission (LPC) might be a better 
analogy. Also the social partnership basis on which it is based. 
For example, hearing evidence in public. It is very evidence-
based. It is hard for the Government not to accept an LPC 
recommendation’. 
 ‘For the LPC, the Government sets the remit. The remit of the 
LPC has been shaped by different political complexions of 
Government, but it has retained stability while being sensitive 
to the changing political environment’. 
 ‘It is difficult for the minimum wage to go up without recourse 
to the LPC. They would not want to do that because of 
precedent. With pensions, there is the question of what the 
commission would look at. For LPC, it is quite tightly defined 
wage rates’. 
Dr Yvonne Braun, director of long-term savings at the ABI, believes that one of the key 
responsibilities of the PCSC would be to consider intergenerational equity. Writing in 
Retirement 2050: Identifying the Challenges of a Changing World, published by the ABI in 
February 2015, she said (p. 29):‘The long-term nature of pensions and retirement income 
mean that policy-making should take a long-term view as much as possible, with policies 
lasting beyond a single Parliament. An independent body (an ‘Office for Intergenerational 
Responsibility’ or a ‘Retirement Commission’) could have an important part to play in 
informing the policy debate and shaping a national long-term savings strategy, so the 
implications of the ageing society are assessed holistically, rather than by individual 
departments’.1027  
This theme was taken up by Michael Johnson, research fellow at the Centre for Policy 
Studies, in briefing note published in June 2015 entitled The Case for an Office for Inter-
generational Responsibility.1028 He argues: 
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The UK’s debt mountain, combined with the risk of an anaemic long-term 
rate of economic growth, poses a serious threat to Generation Y’s future 
economic wellbeing.1029 This, a generation already faced with unaffordable 
housing, college debts, fragmented careers, earnings stagnation, relatively 
thin occupational pension provision, and a rapidly retreating state pension 
age. 
An Office for Inter-generational Responsibility (OIR) should be established 
to co-ordinate the production of Inter-generational Impact Assessments 
and to scrutinise all tax reliefs and exemptions. It could reside alongside (or 
within) the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), and could fruitfully liaise 
with the (now expanding) Office of Tax Simplification.  
An OIR should exude an ethos of fiduciary duty towards current and future 
taxpayers, and aspire to having a reputation for independence akin to that 
of the OBR. If it were to achieve this, it would help close what is currently a 
significant accountability gap between Parliament and the people 
(particularly future taxpayers). In addition, all tax reliefs and exemptions 
could be subject to a five year sunset clause, after which they would cease. 
Lobbyists would be required to present their cases directly to the proposed 
OIR, placing blue water between vested interest groups and ministers. 
 
Politicians were less keen on having a PCSC. While recognising the problems that the 
commission would be trying to address, politicians said it was the responsibility of 
Government to deal with these. Steve Webb, when still Pensions Minister, called for the 
creation of a Department for Pensions and Ageing Society at a Resolution Foundation event 
in February 2015. This would bring together care, the ageing society and long-term savings 
in one department.  He said:  
Your pension outcome depends on every aspect of your life. It depends on 
your life expectancy, on what sort of education you’ve had, what your 
career path is, what sort of firm you work for, whether you’re single, or 
married, or divorced. It depends on everything. So everything affects 
pensions.  And that’s what makes it so unendingly fascinating to me … that 
to get pensions policy right, you can’t just think about pensions. You’ve got 
to think broadly. But what do we do in Government? I’m going to invent a 
word here … siloise. We don’t see people, we see policies. Combining care, 
the ageing society and long-term saving in one place could solve the 
problem, with joint ministers bridging the gaps. Think about your needs in 
retirement. We focus on income needs but what about care needs, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 http://www.cps.org.uk/files/factsheets/original/150616121816-
ThecaseforanOfficeforIntergenerationalResponsibility.pdf?utm_source=Michael+Johnson+contacts&utm_cam
paign=bbea3fa3f8-pensionsminister&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d781b4fd08-bbea3fa3f8-303590773 
1029
 Generation Y: those born between c.1980 and 2000, i.e. aged between 15 and 35 in 2015, also referred to 
as ‘millennials’. They are preceded by Generation X (early 1960’s to 1979 births). 
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what about the overlap between the two? Because presumably you need 
resources in retirement to live off and you need resources in retirement to 
meet your care needs, potentially. Do we have an integrated financial 
product for care and for pensions yet? Not in a meaningful way. Why not? 
Partly because we siloise.  
Many industry practitioners agree that a more joined up approach to pensions and long-
term care is a good idea. For example, Darren Philp said: ‘What we are seeing more and 
more is a lack of a joined up strategy when it comes to pensions policy and more widely. 
You have got a number of Government departments which are responsible for various 
aspects – the Treasury, the DWP, other bodies like HMRC, the FCA, the PRA, TPR, and it’s all 
in a bit of a muddle. I think that, while it’s quite good to have some healthy tension between 
different departments with different objectives, what we’re seeing is policies that directly 
contradict each other and things not pulling in the same direction. To take one example, a 
lot of work was done on collective DC and defined ambition. The next minute, they open the 
whole retirement freedom market with the Budget reforms. The two don’t really go hand in 
hand. Collectivisation and individualism are two very distinct things. For me, we need a long-
term strategy that joins this up’.  
Similarly, Malcolm McLean said: ‘I understand Webb’s frustration….I also understand what 
he means about working in silos. You speak to someone in the department and find out that 
they deal with one thing, but not with something else. I had an occasion to speak to the 
DWP about the state pension and had to speak to one person about the statements and the 
forecasts, somebody else about the qualifying conditions, somebody else about the new 
schemes’. 
However, neither Mr Philp nor Mr McLean agree that overhauling governmental and 
regulatory structure is the best way to achieve more clarity and consistency. Philp says: ‘The 
important thing is that when it comes to manifestoes and developing policies, they’re done 
within a coherent framework and on the basis of evidence. That’s one of the reasons why 
we’ve said that it would be good to have an independent pensions body, like an OFPEN, the 
Office of Pensions Responsibility, that analyses the evidence and holds the Government to 
account against its stated objectives’. 
McLean argues that Webb’s suggestion is impractical: ‘To achieve what he wants, you would 
have to have one department covering the entire operation of Government, which is just 
not practical … The bigger the department, the more it subdivides down. Over the years, I 
think people have recognised the overlap that pensions have with a whole raft of other 
things. Social care is coming into focus now as something that should be linked into it. But I 
don’t think you’ll ever get to a situation where you’ll be able to say we have everything 
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confined into one department. It might be an aspiration, driven by some frustration about 
some of his experiences, but I don’t think it’s practical to cover everything’.1030  
Nigel Waterson, the former shadow Pensions Minister, while accepting that ‘some long 
termism in pensions and savings policy is what is needed, and the stability that only a broad 
political consensus can deliver’, appears to be doubtful that a pensions commission is 
needed: ‘Contribution levels must increase; auto-escalation must also be in the frame. All 
the current talk about decumulation is pretty academic if we don't get up contribution 
levels. We don't need a pensions commission to tell us this!’1031 
Lord David Willetts, the pension expert and former MP, also believes politicians will be 
reluctant to surrender control of certain aspects of pension policy, but was more supportive 
of the idea of a pensions commission having some role: 
I’ve looked at this from time to time and the fact is that the Treasury is 
never going to relinquish the lead on tax decisions, so then the only option 
becomes [delegating pensions policy to the Treasury] and that would be a 
very peculiar arrangement. So I personally think that a Treasury and DWP 
shared responsibility is the best that we can hope for, given the nature of 
the pensions issue.  
I remember the original Turner commission on pensions and I thought that 
part of his effectiveness came from the way it assembled a large amount 
of data that hadn’t been properly brought together before. I think there is 
a case for a long-term commission to provide material evidence so that 
you’ve got a solid, analytical base, especially as it is shared across at least 
two Government departments.  
However, looking back now on my political career over 20 years, every 
area that I’ve worked in, the elite wisdom has been “Take the politicians 
out of it, hand it over to a commission”. Voters actually expect when they 
vote to be changing the Government, they don’t vote for power to be 
continuously in the hands of a group of arm’s-length commissioners. I 
don’t think that somehow decisions won’t be taken by elected politicians – 
that’s what a democracy is.1032  
 
We support the idea of having a standing Pensions, Care and Savings Commission. Such a 
commission could be justified on any number of grounds as discussed above. But perhaps 
the simplest justification would be to help avoid in future the kind of problems that have 
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 Reported in Louise Farrand (2015) Webb: End pensions silos and create a bigger department, Engaged 
Investor, 12 February. 
1031
 Nigel Waterson  (2015) A time for consolidation – why Altmann must avoid ‘initiative-itis’, Professional 
Pensions, 27 May.  
1032
 Quoted in  Louise Farrand (2015) David Willetts: ‘Pure DC ends up with too much risk being borne by the 
individual’, Pensions Insight, 16 March. 
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emerged with the introduction of ‘freedom and choice’ without any consultation with 
industry, as raised in our interview panels: 
 ‘The Pension Commission had an evidence basis for its policy recommendation – 
auto-enrolment – namely, the success AE as a nudge in the US to increase DC 
savings. There was no evidence basis for “freedom and choice”’ 
 ‘Even supporters of these proposals could not deny that they failed the test of 
having an impact and risk assessment. Further, they are a clear example of short-
term political populism at the expense of long-term stability’. 
 ‘Failure by Government to put in place both success criteria – in particular, a 
definition of  ‘what good outcomes are’ – and methods of measuring and monitoring 
outcomes in response to the new flexibilities, resulting in a complete data vacuum’ 
 ‘Coupling of flexibility and choice which disregards any understanding about how 
real people choose’ 
 ‘Lack of member engagement – a disconnect between auto-enrolment at the front 
end and “freedom and choice” at the back end. Engagement is not necessary for AE 
– it is critical for “freedom and choice” to work’ 
 ‘Whoever does it, it is crucial to have information and discussions with employees in 
the workplace to engage them. A workplace visit is the holy grail but is not 
commercially viable in small companies. But smart electronic communications can 
replace face-to-face meetings. Communication, information, education, simplified 
advice are all needed for engagement. Pension Wise does not deliver this’ 
 ‘Adequate financial education not in place for Flexiday; for example, most people are 
incapable of converting a lump sum into an income equivalent, believing that 
£50,000 is a ‘large’ lump sum, when it is only one third of the value of the new 
single-tier state pension of £8,000 p.a.’ 
 ‘Failure to put guided pathways with defaults in place for Flexiday’ 
 ‘No clarity on charge structures, unlike auto-enrolment’ 
 ‘Insufficient protection in place for consumers who are at risk of mis-selling or ‘rip 
off’ charges’ 
 ‘Failure to understand that safeguards only work if people are engaged and 
understand the risks’  
 ‘Failure to recognise the likelihood of scams – criminals can now directly target 
individuals who can readily be fooled (even if they are also generally smart). The 
Insurance Fraud Taskforce has noticed that the criminals involved with trips & slips, 
whiplash and the claim management companies (dealing with PPI) have moved to 
pension liberation. You don’t actually have to be a criminal, just someone who 
recommends an unsuitable investment. Fraud might actually fall, because it is legal 
to promote high risk investments. But people will face cliff edge outcomes – either 
the investment performs very well, or you lose everything. The worst case would be 
to lose the entire pot and then have to pay tax on this’ 
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 ‘No impact assessment on additional state spending if people spend all their money’ 
 ‘Failure to deal with the overarching need to encourage more saving’ 
 ‘Failure to recognise the consequences of “freedom and choice” for employers and 
their retirement management policy’ 
 ‘Failure to recognise the long-term consequences for occupational pension provision 
of the reduction in tax breaks – it reduces the incentive for employers to set up a 
pension scheme. Directors can no longer see a benefit in setting up a pension 
scheme, since they do not benefit as much as in the past. Lower income people just 
want the pot and not a pension. A whole range of people with higher incomes are 
likely to find themselves with considerably poorer pension arrangements than the 
baby boom generation’ 
 ‘Failure to recognise the complete lack of engagement by small employers’ 
 ‘Pensions are now just a savings product, so why not outsource the whole lot?’ 
In short, there is no longer a coherent national narrative about what pensions are for, just a 
lot of noise around a series of short-term policy initiatives. This prompted the following 
remarks from our interviewees: 
 ‘What are we trying to achieve with pensions – there is no narrative?’ 
 ‘People want access to cash – more than ever now. Why? Because there are no well-
established social/cultural norms about what to do at retirement’ 
 ‘We need a consensus – to get people to understand that pensions are there to 
provide an income and people still need an income in retirement. The worst thing 
would be for the lump sum to become the norm’ 
 ‘We are a long way from establishing good social norms and cultures in 
decumulation’ 
 ‘There is a complete lack of legislative and regulatory clarity’ 
 ‘Trustees are reluctant to help members – far too risky. Trustees are concerned 
about getting involved due to the regulatory vacuum. They can’t do the right thing in 
case they get sued. They can’t offer scheme drawdown without employer approval – 
which they won’t get’ 
 ‘What will IGCs do to encourage engagement and participation?’ 
 ‘Why would anyone bring a product to market at the present time? The reforms 
were horribly rushed – regulated providers will bring more products online in time, 
but the pension industry was not set up to deliver such freedoms, so the danger is 
that people will go elsewhere. This is the biggest short term danger’ 
 ‘There is no clear differentiation between regulated and unregulated businesses. In 
recent years, regulated businesses have improved capital adequacy, professionalism 
and reporting, so there is now a growing gap with unregulated businesses’ 
 ‘What is tax relief trying to achieve?’ 
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The pension reforms that followed the 2014 Budget would not be the first example of what 
Anthony King and Ivor Crewe called ‘cultural disconnect’ in their recent book The Blunders 
of Our Governments.1033 By this they meant a set of assumptions that look obvious to well-
educated, middle-class politicians and officials but which collapse when tested in the real 
world. Perhaps the most famous example of cultural disconnect is the poll tax. King and 
Crewe argue that: ‘The man in Whitehall not only did not know best; he did not know that 
he did not know that which he badly needed to know’. Since all the men in Whitehall paid 
their taxes, they assumed that everyone would too. The warning cry from a junior official 
‘Try collecting it in Brixton’ went unheeded. The minister subsequently brought in to clear 
up the mess said: ‘It needed exceptionally clever people to produce anything so stupid’.1034  
The people who conceived the ‘freedom and choice’ regime appear to have very little 
understanding of longevity risk. We were told at the time that the only piece of information 
that people need to be aware of is their life expectancy. Yet around 50% of 65-year olds will 
live beyond their life expectancy, often by many years.  
A new type of commission is needed to reduce the risk of anything like this happening again. 
 
7.6 Contributing to a national narrative 5: The pension tax system and the level of pension 
savings 
The fifth contribution needs to come from the pension tax regime and the level of pension 
savings it encourages.  
7.6.1 The original system of pension taxation1035 
The system of pension taxation in the UK used to be fairly straightforward. It was based on 
the exempt-exempt,-taxed (EET) framework:1036  
 Exempt – the pension contributions by individuals and employers receive tax relief 
and employer contributions are exempt from national insurance contributions 
 Exempt – no tax is charged on investment growth from pension contributions, and  
 Taxed – pensions in payment are taxed as other income, but individuals are able to 
take up to 25% of their pension fund as a lump sum on retirement. 
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 Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2014) The Blunders of Our Governments, Oneworld Publications, London. 
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The 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government introduced a set of five 
pension taxation principles consistent with the EET framework:1037  
1. The purpose of tax-relieved pension saving is to provide an income in retirement.1038  
2. Any changes to the pensions tax rules should not incur Exchequer cost and should 
not create any opportunities for tax avoidance.  
3. Individuals should have the flexibility to decide when and how best to turn their 
pension savings into a retirement income, provided that they have sufficient income 
to avoid exhausting savings prematurely and fall back on the state.  
4. In line with the EET model, pension benefits taken during an individual’s lifetime 
should be taxed at income tax rates. The tax-free pension commencement lump sum 
will continue to be available.  
5. On death, pension savings that have been accumulated with tax relief should be 
taxed at an appropriate rate to recover past relief given, unless they are used to 
provide a pension for a dependant. 
The EET framework provides generous tax incentives to save for a pension and is also 
designed to be broadly tax neutral over the life cycle. The tax relief that is granted during 
the accumulation phase of a pension scheme is reclaimed when the pension is taxed during 
the decumulation phase, so that the same income is not taxed twice. This recognises a long-
standing principle of taxation in the UK, namely that tax relief is given at the same marginal 
rate as income is taxed. There is an anomaly in that 25% of the pension pot can be taken as 
a tax-free lump sum. But broadly speaking, the EET system is generally regarded as fair at 
the level of the individual. 
While the EET system might be broadly fair in the sense of being tax neutral over an 
individual’s life cycle, it nevertheless favours higher rate tax payers at the expense of 
standard rate tax payers, and especially those who are higher rate tax payers in work and 
only basic rate tax payers in retirement. In 2013-14, the total cost to HM Treasury of 
pension tax relief was £34.3bn (although around £13.1bn was offset by income tax 
deducted from pension payments).1039 A 2013 study by the Pensions Policy Institute1040 
showed that around 20% of tax relief was paid to additional rate taxpayers, who make up 
only 1% of UK taxpayers. Some 80% of UK taxpayers pay the basic rate of income tax but 
benefit from only 25% of the tax relief on pensions’. The PPI report states that ‘there are 
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 Melissa Echalier, John Adams, Daniel Redwood and Chris Curry (2013) Tax Relief for Pension Saving in the 
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concerns that tax relief is expensive, poorly targeted and does not achieve its policy 
objectives’.1041  
7.6.2 The new system of pension taxation 
The pension reforms, introduced by the 2014 Budget, ended the requirement to annuitise 
pension wealth – the fundamental rationale of a pension scheme. Further, the 2014 
Taxation of Pensions Act which – by ending the 55% tax charge on pension death benefits if 
the member dies before 75 –  allowed pension assets to become inheritable. Both these 
measures have completely distorted the EET model and bring into question the whole 
system of very generous tax relief currently granted to pension savings and investment.1042   
Tom McPhail, head of pensions research at Hargreaves Lansdown, believes the current 
system is now ‘in a complete mess’. He said the five principles of pension taxation 
introduced in 2010 – in particular that a pension should be for retirement income and the 
state would reclaim tax benefits on death –  had been ‘torn up’ by the Government that 
introduced them in the space of one parliament.1043  
The abolition of the 55% tax charge on pension death benefits has conferred massive tax 
benefits on a small group of very wealthy people.1044 They received tax relief on pension 
contributions and investment returns at the highest marginal rate in the accumulation stage 
and will be able to transfer those benefits tax free to their descendants if they die before 75. 
John Ralfe’s letter to the Financial Times of 8 October 2014 stated: ‘the…Government has 
created a simple way for the richest to avoid paying income tax and pass on wealth tax free 
to their grandchildren’. Andy James, head of retirement planning at Towry, said ‘The new 
regime will bring pensions into overall inheritance planning for wealthy people. You can pay 
the maximum into a pension, currently £1.25m, and it could pass down the generations tax 
free….Sadly, the changes to the tax charges on death for pensions will not help those who 
are still struggling to build up sufficient funds to pay for their retirement’.1045  
The ending of the 55% tax charge will have further serious unintended consequences as 
Craig Berry points out: ‘At the moment, people are rightly able to bequeath DC pensions 
pots when they die. But those inheriting these pots are, rightly, heavily taxed when they do, 
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reflecting the significant tax relief that supported the savings being accrued in the first 
place. From now on, however, these restrictions will be virtually abolished. This has two 
immediate implications. Firstly, it further biases the pensions tax relief system towards the 
wealthiest savers, that is, those likely to leave inheritable pots behind. Secondly, and most 
importantly in terms of the economics of pensions provision, it means individuals will be 
encouraged to keep their savings invested in their pensions scheme. … In fact, not only is 
annuitisation no longer compulsory, for the wealthiest savers, it is now being significantly 
disincentivised. This brings us to the crux of the matter, and the most important long-term 
implication: all of this makes annuities more expensive. If insurance companies cannot rely 
on a steady stream of wealthy retirees buying annuities, they lose scale efficiences, and will 
have to make their products more expensive for the mass market. In two swift strokes, 
auto-enrolment begins to unravel. The historic compromise that led to DC pensions being 
universalised has been hugely undermined.….. The only way that “ordinary savers” are going 
to be affected by this is that they are going to have to pay more to get those annuities. In 
short, they will be considerably worse off’.1046 
Tom McPhail agrees that the abolition of the tax charge has reduced the attraction of 
annuities: ‘The whole direction of government policy is going against allowing retirees to 
benefit from mortality cross-subsidy, 1047  which is one of the most valuable and 
economically-sound factors that can influence their retirement outcomes. The mortality 
cross-subsidy is a highly efficient way of maximising your retirement income. The current 
direction of policy is significantly undermining the stability of the pension system. I feel 
uncomfortable at the way the Treasury has suggested 18m people in DB schemes will be 
able to benefit from the new freedoms. That is an irresponsible attitude. People will want to 
transfer out and schemes will collude with them on this. They will offer maybe 95 per cent 
of the value of benefits, and people will take them up on it. I think it is cynical on the part of 
the Government to position this in this way’. 1048 
Natalie Holt, editor of Money Marketing, argues that the new regime provides a clear 
incentive to reduce inheritance tax: ‘Whereas previously pensions were about providing for 
savers in their retirement, they may now be about sheltering assets beyond the person’s 
lifetime’.1049 According to Chris Marshall, technical officer at Hornbuckle, ‘the change to IHT 
proposed by the Conservatives [which raises the threshold on primary homes to £1m] will 
disproportionately benefit the well-off (IHT currently affects only 8% of estates, and, 
according to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, the changes would mean limiting it to the top 
6%), [whereas] the theme of changes to pension tax relief since 2009 has been to reduce 
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the cost to the taxpayer by getting those at the top of the income ladder to pay for it, or at 
least to limit the amount they save into pensions, and thereby decrease how much tax relief 
they get’.1050 
Nevertheless, inheritance planning cannot be explicitly used to avoid paying inheritance tax 
on pension assets. As Michelle McGagh states: ‘pensions are now being seen as a way to 
pass on money to the next generation tax efficiently. This means wealthier pensioners who 
do not need their pensions to live on can ring-fence their savings for their family. However, 
there is a concern that HMRC will not look kindly on those it believes are gaming the 
system’.1051 For example, if someone makes extra large contributions or consolidates a 
number of pensions and then dies within two years, HMRC could view under the ‘disposition 
of assets’ rules and levy IHT if it believes individuals are using pensions to shelter money.   
In the Autumn Statement in November 2015, the Treasury clarified the situation. It said it 
would legislate to ensure an IHT liability will not arise when a pension scheme member 
designates funds for drawdown, but does not draw all of the funds before death, with the 
change backdated to apply to deaths on or after 6 April 2011. 
7.6.3  What is the role if any of pension taxation relief? 
Now that there is no requirement to annuitise, one of the original justifications for providing 
tax relief has gone. A pension scheme is now no more than a wealth accumulation scheme. 
That raises some fundamental questions. Why should tax payers subsidise pensioners 
buying Lamborghinis or transferring their pension wealth to their grandchildren? It is still 
possible to make the regime tax neutral, but why bother in the first place? These questions 
have prompted renewed interest in the role of pension tax relief since the introduction of 
‘freedom and choice’. 
In March 2015, the ACA published a consultation paper, Creating a Sustainable Pensions Tax 
Framework, which called on all political parties to cooperate with industry in a fundamental 
review of pension taxation that will lead to a sustainable pension taxation system that can 
be readily understood and can properly incentivise retirement savings.1052 The ACA said it 
had significant concerns that further reductions will be made to pension tax relief whichever 
party or parties form the next Government and that the changes will be placed on an 
already overly complex system.  
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The paper’s main recommendations are: 
 There should be no ‘knee jerk’ changes to the pension taxation system after the 
General Election. The ACA notes that even a reduction in the Lifetime Allowance 
(LTA) might look a simple change – but it brings a new range of individuals into a 
potentially complex net and creates a new ‘protected case’ for schemes to have to 
deal with – so its impact should not be underestimated 
 The next Government should initiate a fundamental cross-party review of the 
pension taxation system working closely with employers, pension providers, 
consultants and administration providers to ensure the new system is practical 
 The review should ensure that full details of the current reliefs, and their distribution 
between various constituencies, are understood 
 Changes to pension taxation should have cross-party support so that any new 
framework can endure 
 Any new framework should be given an appropriate lead time so that those who 
manage schemes can change systems appropriately and employers and individuals 
can plan properly for any new change 
 Once in place the new framework should not have any changes made to it for many 
years. 
The ACA argues that any significant reduction to the amount of tax relief granted on 
contributions could lead to a withdrawal from pension savings which is counter to recent 
government policies, such as auto-enrolment, which are designed to encourage greater 
participation. It believes that complexity results in individuals being put off saving for 
retirement, employers are deterred from establishing and maintaining pension schemes 
beyond the minimum enforced by auto-enrolment, and, for individuals who do save 
diligently (and for employers supporting this), the costs of ensuring compliance with current 
tax law means ultimately that there is less money available for retirement savings. 
The tax system could also be used to provide appropriate incentives. An example of this 
would be to scrap stamp duty for older people to help them move out of under-occupied 
homes, a proposal made by Legal & General in June 2015. 
The insurer has published a report called Free up Housing Stock – Report into the Last Time 
Buyer Market.1053 The report focuses on ‘last-time buyers’ (LTBs), those aged over 55 who 
are sitting on housing wealth of £820 billion that is forecast to increase to £1.2 trillion by 
2020. It estimates that 5.3 million last-time buyers live in under-occupied homes with 7.7 
million spare bedrooms, equivalent to 2.6 million family homes. However, 3.3 million last-
time buyers want to downsize, typically from a four-bed to a two-bed property. While a 
third of older people considered downsizing in the last five years, only 7% did so. This has 
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had the effect of stalling the property market as younger families can neither find nor afford 
suitably large homes. To get around this, L&G believes LTBs should be offered tax breaks, 
such as scrapping stamp duty ‘to incentivise right-sizing’ and to encourage people to sell 
their home and downsize in later life, freeing up family-size properties for younger 
generations.  
L&G also wants to deal with the ‘chronic undersupply of age-specific housing’, given that 
just 2% of the UK’s housing stock is classified as retirement housing. Another problem is that 
the majority of the retirement properties available in the UK are sold on a leasehold basis 
which will not be attractive to many buyers. The report says: ‘[We need] increased volumes 
of homes across all tenures, including freehold, shared equity and rented options, [that] 
would allow the system to cater to a wider variety of needs and offer flexibility as people’s 
needs change in later life’. The report would also like to see a larger ‘new homes bonus’ 
given to those buying retirement-specific property or a ‘council tax holiday for new 
retirement homes’ for the first three years.  
L&G has set out a 10-point plan to make downsizing easier. Its recommendations are: 
 Government to support provision of age-specific housing 
 Housing connected with infrastructure, social and health systems 
 Retirement housing shouldn't just be leasehold properties 
 More mid-market supply on top of affordable housing 
 Public policy should support urban locations for retirement villages 
 Greater tax reliefs to encourage downsizing 
 Consolidate benefits, which influence retirement housing 
 Planning authorities should standardise approaches 
 Remove development levies imposed by planning system 
 Government should encourage use of equity release.  
Nigel Wilson, chief executive of L&G, said: ‘Helping young people to get onto the housing 
ladder through initiatives like Help-to-Buy is important, but enabling older people to realise 
their downsizing dreams could have a far greater impact in terms of unlocking family 
housing stock for people to buy’.1054  
Michael Johnson, in a report entitled Who Will Care for Generation Y?, published by the 
Centre for Policy Studies in June 2015, again considers the question of intergenerational 
fairness.1055 He estimates the size of the tax burden being passed to the next generation.  
His calculations show that the gap between the UK’s liabilities and assets grew by an 
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‘unsustainable’ 51% in the five years to end-March 2014, to £1,852 billion. At 111% of GDP, 
this is equivalent to £70,000 per household. If the state pension, the largest of all unfunded 
liabilities (roughly £4,000 billion) is included, the burden per household rises to £221,000.  
The report warns that Generation Y could be the first generation to experience a quality of 
life below that of its (baby boomer) parents.  
Mr Johnson comments: ‘Baby boomers have become masters at perpetrating inter-
generational injustice, by making vast unfunded promises to themselves, notably in respect 
of pensions. Indeed, such is their scale that if the UK were accounted for as a public 
company, it would be bust. In any event, Generation Y will have to foot the bill.… Reining 
back on unfunded promises means either stop making them, or fund them now, which 
would require higher taxation (or additional cuts in public spending)’. 
 
To improve transparency and put a brake on deferring costs, the report outlines six 
proposals: 
1. The UK’s Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) balance sheet should include a 
liability to represent future State Pension payments [which they currently do not 
do], based upon a realistic expectation of the future cash outflow, discounted using 
the UK gilt yield curve. 
2. Draft legislation which, if implemented, would produce unfunded spending 
commitments, should be accompanied by an Inter-generational Impact Assessment 
to quantify the impact on the young, i.e., future taxpayers.  
3. An Office of Fiscal Responsibility should be established, under the aegis of the 
Chancellor, to scrutinise the effectiveness and value for money of all tax reliefs and 
exemptions. 
4. All tax reliefs and exemptions should be subject to a five year sunset clause, after 
which they would cease. Lobbyists should be requested to present their cases 
directly to the proposed Office of Fiscal Responsibility, to ensure blue water between 
vested interest groups and ministers. 
5. Departmental budgets should be set both gross and net of expenditure on tax reliefs 
and exemptions, to ensure transparency as to the true level of financial support to 
each area of public policy. 
6. The Prime Minister should embellish his doctrine of personal, professional, civic and 
corporate responsibilities by adding a fifth category: inter-generational 
responsibility. 
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In October 2015, Michael Johnson published another Centre for Policy Studies report 
entitled An ISA-Centric Savings World, in which he proposed replacing the EET pension tax 
system with one similar to the TEE system of ISAs.1056 In particular, he proposed that: 
 All income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) relief on pensions 
contributions be scrapped, to be replaced by a more redistributive 50p Treasury 
incentive per post-tax £1 saved. This should be paid irrespective of the savers tax-
paying status, thereby nailing the conundrum that because income tax is 
progressive, tax relief is inevitably regressive.  A 50p incentive would significantly 
help realise the Pension Commission’s vision for median earners to have a two-thirds 
total combined earnings replacement rate. 
 Employer contributions, taxed as employee income but eligible for the Treasury 
incentive, would be paid into a Workplace ISA, operating within the auto-enrolment 
arena. Withdrawals would not be permitted until the age of 60, thereby trapping the 
incentive, along with income and net capital gains. Thereafter, they would be, 
ideally, tax-free. 
 Auto-enrolled employee contributions, paid post-tax but attracting the Treasury 
incentive, would go into an employee’s Lifetime ISA. 
 The Workplace ISA and Lifetime ISA could reside within an ISA warehouse, alongside 
other segregated ISA cells dedicated to specific saving purposes (Help-to-Buy, long-
term care, etc.). The ISA warehouse could become a universal, all-purpose savings 
vehicle to serve everyone from cradle to grave. Simplicity to the fore. 
 Each ISA cell would have its own (tax-based) incentives and deterrents, to reflect 
prevailing policy objectives. They would share a modest annual allowance, such as 
£8,000, subject to Treasury modelling confirmation. A smaller incentive, for example, 
could accommodate a higher annual allowance. 
The report introduced the idea of an ISA Pension, secured with Workplace ISA assets, from 
the age of 60.  Mr Johnson argues: ‘The primary driver for moving from pensions’ EET 
framework to the TEE world of ISAs is the inflexibility of pension savings prior to 55. This is 
at odds with how those in Generation Y, in particular, are living their lives. Many eschew 
pension saving, thereby missing out on tax relief, but engagement with ISAs is high. Ready 
access and flexibility is valued above tax relief: EET is patently failing the next generation. In 
addition, a single TEE tax framework for savings would represent a marked simplification of 
the savings arena. ..Given the individual and societal benefits of annuitisation, a Treasury-
funded inducement should be considered, such as a 25% income uplift. Indeed, this 
approach could be extended to today’s ISA suite.  Participation would be optional, 
consistent with 2014’s pensions’ liberalisation’.  He described the current system pension 
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tax relief as ‘expensive, incompatible, inequitable, illogical, incomprehensible and, crucially, 
an ineffective use of Treasury funds’.  
7.6.4 The Government’s consultation  
The newly elected Conservative Government released a consultation paper on pension 
taxation in July 2015.1057 The consultation will examine whether there is a case for 
overhauling the current EET system of tax relief, where relief is given on contributions and 
investment income but the benefits on retirement are taxed. 
The Government said the key principles any reform should meet are: 
 It should be simple and transparent. The Government said it believes that greater 
simplicity and transparency may encourage greater engagement with pension saving 
and strengthen the incentive for individuals to save into a pension 
 It should allow individuals to take personal responsibility for ensuring they have 
adequate savings for retirement. It should encourage people to save enough during 
their working lives to meet their aspirations for a sufficient standard of living in 
retirement 
 It should build on the early success of automatic enrolment in encouraging new 
people to save more 
 It should be sustainable. Any proposal for reform should also be in line with the 
Government's long-term fiscal strategy. 
One option to be examined is bringing the tax treatment of pensions into line with ISAs (i.e., 
replacing the EET system with a TEE system) along the lines proposed by Michael Johnson 
who has estimated that such a move could save the Government £10bn a year. In launching 
the consultation in the Budget on 8 July 2015, the Chancellor, George Osborne, said: 
‘Pensions could be taxed like ISAs. You pay in from taxed income – and it’s tax free when 
you take it out. And in-between it receives a top-up from the Government. This idea, and 
others like it, need careful and public consideration before we take any steps. So I am today 
publishing a green paper that asks questions, invites views, and takes care not to pre-judge 
the answer. Our goal is clear: we want to move from an economy built on debt to an 
economy built on the more secure and productive foundations of saving and long- term 
investment’. 
The idea of having a consultation was welcomed by industry. For example, Hugh Nolan, 
chief actuary at JLT Employee Benefits, said ‘We welcome any genuine consultation to put 
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pensions onto a sound footing for the future, recognising that it's just one form of overall 
saving’.1058  
However, the proposal to tax pensions like ISAs was criticised in some quarters. An early 
critic was the Pensions Minister Ros Altmann who said ‘a pension is not an ISA’ and a switch 
could be ‘dangerous’ for retirees, claiming pensions under the new regime would be ‘too 
easy to spend too soon’.  She said: ‘I do fear that making pension withdrawals tax free at a 
relatively young age (60s and 70s is not old these days) offers dangerous incentives to stop 
locking the money in for later life. Policy must be mindful of offering the right incentives not 
the wrong ones….Just saving from taxed income isn’t attractive…It’s important to ensure 
money is kept in pensions for longer’. Under Mr Johnson’s proposed framework, employer 
contributions would be locked in until retirement, while only the employee contributions 
would be accessible at any time. 1059 Another critic was Steve Webb, the previous Pensions 
Minister. He argued that a move to pension ISAs would be a ‘fallacy’ and a huge step into 
the unknown’ which could undermine long-term saving: ‘The taxation of pension incomes 
provides a “brake” on the Lamborghini. Having to pay tax makes you think twice about 
withdrawing the lot in one go; if pensions are tax free, what would hold you back?’1060  
A number of providers, asset managers and advisers have also come out against the 
proposal, claiming it would damage the savings culture: 
 Zurich said that, according to a survey it conducted, tax relief on contributions is the 
most powerful way to incentivise people to save for retirement, with more than two-
thirds of over-55s surveyed agreeing with this. Gary Shaughnessy, chief executive of 
Zurich UK Life, said: ‘A move to ISA-style pensions could reverse the early success of 
auto-enrolment. If individuals are taxed on employer contributions, there is a very 
real concern that they would opt out to avoid a hit on their take-home pay’. 
 Royal London CEO, Phil Loney, believes savers would not trust the system, concerned 
that the Government would have changed its mind about offering tax-free cash by 
the time it comes to their retirement. 
 Axa Wealth head of retirement planning, Andy Zanelli, argued that the proposals 
would lead to more people taking out accessible savings products and drawing their 
cash before retirement and hence running out of money. He said: ‘If you are trying 
to address the savings issue by allowing them to put money into something 
accessible it won’t work. It’s counterproductive. If ISAs and pensions do the same 
                                                     
1058
  Quoted in Natasha Browne (2015) Summer Budget - Government eyes scrapping tax relief on pension 
contributions, Professional Pensions, 8 July. 
1059
  Reported in Josephine Cumbo and Jim Pickard (2015) Pensions minister questions Osborne plan, Financial 
Times, 16 July. 
1060
 Quoted in Katie Morley (2015) 'Pension Isas' will encourage pensioners to buy Lamborghinis, Daily 
Telegraph, 29 September. 
576 
 
thing people might promote the ISA in place of the pension. People would be 
tempted to draw money in times of a “crisis” and everybody defines “crisis” 
differently. If there is one allowance for both products nobody would go for the 
pension’. 1061 
 Aviva published research which said that two-thirds of companies believe that a shift 
to an ISA system would lead to employees saving less into their pension. 
 AllianceBernstein said a move to an ISA-style system ‘would represent such a 
significant shift as to undermine long-term confidence in the robustness of pensions 
– savers would lack confidence in locking their money up in a system which could 
potentially change the tax treatment without prior notice’. Further, it would not 
improve the incentive to save, but instead make it ‘considerably more complex’ for 
employees currently paying a higher rate of tax, and would be ‘highly costly’ to 
introduce across the industry.1062 
 A survey of 170 advisers by A J Bell found that there was only 4% support for ISA 
style pensions, with 59% saying they did not think the pension tax relief system 
needs to change. 
 Almost half of advisers – 42% – thought it is right that tax relief is received at the 
rate tax is paid, while 40% said there has been enough change and a period of 
stability is required. Only a third of the advisers questioned said they would like to 
see a flat rate incentive, the majority of which supported one set at 30%, in between 
the basic rate of 20% and the higher rates of 40%-45%. About 8% favoured a system 
of matching Government contributions on a two for one basis.1063 
Zurich, AXA and Aviva agree that the pension tax system should be simplified rather than 
unified with ISA tax relief. They propose that the Government introduces a flat rate tax relief 
of 33%  – a £1 top-up to their pension for every £2 saved – and removes the current £1.25m 
lifetime allowance. 1064   
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) has argued that ending tax relief on 
contributions by switching from EET to TEE would not necessarily save the Government 
money and could instead cut the tax take by 15%. It said: ‘Modelling a central scenario, 
which assumes different proportions of contributions from different types of taxpayer — 
both before and after retirement — the tax take for TEE would be 15% less than under the 
current system’. The NAPF also said it was a ‘myth’ that higher-rate taxpayers benefited 
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more from the current system than basic-rate tax payers: ‘Under the current system, pound 
for pound saved before tax, higher earners generally get a lower amount of pension to 
spend and pay more tax on their pension savings than lower earners. Non-taxpayers and 
basic-rate savers who drop a tax bracket in retirement do well out of the current system. 
They would lose from a shift to TEE, but would be winners under a single rate of tax relief of 
25%’.1065 Joanne Segars, NAPF chief executive, said in a statement on 30 September 2015: 
‘The Government says it wants to incentivise saving but it also wants to increase the 
revenue to the Exchequer – but these two objectives are incompatible and lead to quite 
different courses of action. There is a very real risk that to increase the tax take in the short-
term, the Government will gamble away the long-term interest of savers’. The NAPF 
chairman, Ruston Smith, went further and said that the proposed Government changes to 
pensions tax relief threatened to turn pension revolution into pension implosion’: they 
could ‘literally dig up and smash the foundations set to create a society of lifetime savers – 
putting pressure back on our ageing society’.1066 
In October 2015, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) published 
An Economic Analysis of the Existing Taxation of Pensions (EET) versus an Alternative Regime 
(TEE) and found that under TEE, personal savings would fall, resulting in lower consumption, 
a lower capital stock and productivity and a higher interest rate. There is also a ‘dynamic 
inconsistency problem inherent in TEE’ as a future Government could reverse the policy or 
re-introduce taxation on pension income.1067 
The Government said it would announce its new policy on pensions tax relief decision in the 
March 2016 Budget. 
7.6.5 The effectiveness of pension tax relief 
While providing an incentive to save for those who understand pension tax relief, a survey 
of 1,794 working adults aged below 65 conducted by YouGov and published by The People’s 
Pension in September 2015 revealed that 74% of pension savers do not understand (59%) or 
have not heard of pension tax relief (15%). The provider suggested the Government's 
consultation into tax relief was an opportunity to raise awareness about it and encourage 
people to save more. Darren Philp said: ‘This research confirms that tax relief is not well 
understood and calls into question whether it is really acting as an incentive to save. 
Incentives only work where they are clear and understandable. Unfortunately, the current 
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system is just not up to the job’. The survey also revealed that 62% would be more likely to 
increase the amount they saved if the Government matched their contributions.1068 
We would argue that the following factors should be taken into account when designing a 
system of pension taxation and pension tax relief that encourages the optimal level of 
pension savings. We believe that the role of tax policy should be to help achieve one or 
more Government aims when private sector outcomes are considered to be sub-optimal or 
undesirable. In terms of pension tax relief, potential Government aims might be (different 
Governments will put different weights on these): 
1. To encourage the level of pension savings needed to achieve a target standard of 
living in retirement which might be defined as: 
a) ‘essential’ – income sufficient to cover an individual’s minimum basic 
expenditure needs 
b) ‘adequate’ – income sufficient to achieve a minimum lifestyle to which an 
individual aspires in retirement 
c) ‘desired’ – income sufficient to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
individual aspires in retirement. 
2. To encourage individuals to make provision for long-term care. (While this is not 
directly a pension issue, the relationship between the joint increases in longevity and 
morbidity inevitably link the two.) 
3. To achieve tax neutrality over the life cycle. One objective of pension tax relief is to 
encourage larger pension funds than otherwise, but to do so in a way that is tax 
neutral to each generational cohort, so that the cumulative value of tax reliefs during 
the accumulation phase broadly equals the present value of tax that will be collected 
during the decumulation phase (both valued at the date of retirement). 
4. To achieve a degree of equity between members of the same generation through a 
redistribution of resources between low- and high-income individuals, men and 
women etc. 
5. To achieve a degree of equity across generations and, in particular, to avoid unfair 
burdens falling on future generations. 
It is also important to recognise the two principal types of individual decision makers, 
‘econs’ and ‘humans’. As we discussed in Chapter 3, ‘econs’ are fully rational lifecycle 
financial planners. They perfectly understand and value the role of pensions in redistributing 
consumption over the lifecycle from the work phase to retirement. ‘Econs’ will start and 
optimally manage their own pension schemes regardless of any tax incentives. 
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‘Humans’, by contrast, have behavioural traits and face behavioural barriers which inhibit 
them from behaving optimally. In a pension context, a particularly important behavioural 
trait of humans is a poor understanding of the time dimension of their lives. Many humans 
have a good understanding of the present and the near future, but have very little 
comprehension of the distant future. The idea of thinking about their older self in 10 years’, 
20 years’ or 30 years’ time is completely alien to them. This leads to a practice known as 
hyperbolic discounting which implies that people exhibit short-term impatience and long-
term patience. The classic illustration of this is that, given the choice between one apple 
now and two apples tomorrow, most people choose the apple now (short-term impatience 
or the desire for instant gratification). But given the choice between one apple in 100 days 
and two apples in 101 days, most people choose the two apples (long-term patience or a 
willingness to exhibit deferred gratification). Transposed into a pension context, humans can 
see the benefits of saving for retirement if it is explained to them (deferred gratification), 
but since they only live in and comprehend the present, they never start the pension plan 
(i.e., without a pre-commitment device, they never get to that 100th day in the future 
where they would exhibit long-term patience and see the benefits of deferred gratification), 
since they are unwilling to give up current consumption (short-term impatience and instant 
gratification always dominate). Another related behavioural trait is inertia: people see the 
benefits of saving for retirement, but never get around to starting their pension plan. 
Another one is lack of willpower: again people see the benefits of saving for retirement, and 
may even start a pension plan, but they do not have the willpower to maintain it over the 
long investment horizon required. 
Now let us look at the role and effectiveness of pension tax relief with these two different 
types of decision maker. The position with econs is straightforward: they will plan their 
pension plan optimally regardless of any tax incentives. In fact, pension tax incentives are 
not needed for econs. However, the evidence suggests that the proportion of econs in the 
population is low. Most people are humans. 
The role and effectiveness of pension tax relief in the case of humans depends on how 
severe their behavioural barriers are. If the barriers are low – people understand the value 
of pensions, and are willing to save for a pension, but suffer from inertia – then people just 
need an incentive or a nudge to get started. Tax relief provides such a nudge. UK pension 
tax policy is predicated on idea that most people are humans and need some 
encouragement to start a pension scheme. Governments have, however, differed in their 
view about how severe the behavioural barriers are. Before 1988, people were obliged to 
join their employer’s pension scheme as a condition of employment, although they still 
received the tax relief. This suggests that prior to 1988, Governments believed that the 
behavioural barriers were sufficiently high that nudges alone would not be adequate and 
that compulsion was needed. However, between 1988 and 2012, there has been no 
compulsion to join a company pension scheme. The Government’s argument in 1988 was 
that people should be free to choose how they spend their money, suggesting they thought 
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that most people were in fact econs. The declining membership of workplace pension 
schemes, especially in the private sector, since 1988 provides evidence that this is not the 
case and that most people are indeed humans. This has been accepted by all Governments 
since the Pension Commission recommended auto-enrolment (a classic example of the use 
of inertia to help humans overcome a behavioural barrier) in workplace pension schemes in 
2005. AE was introduced with all-party support in 2012.  
With this in mind, we can now examine the potential reform of pension tax relief in the light 
of the five aims of Government pension tax relief policy above: 
1. The cost of the tax relief here depends on both the chosen target standard of living 
for each individual (essential, adequate, or desired) and the number of individuals 
covered. Clearly, the more generous the target, the more generous the tax relief and 
the less the Government has available to spend elsewhere. The number of 
individuals covered will also depend on the success of auto-enrolment. If auto-
enrolment is successful in bringing more people currently without pensions into the 
pension system, then total tax relief will rise. If auto-enrolment fails, an alternative 
way – possibly the only way – of getting more people to join a pension scheme is 
compulsion. This would, in turn, reduce the need for such generous tax relief.  
 
2. The current situation with long-term care provision needs to be resolved. Most 
people do not seriously prepare for the possibility of long-term care until it is too 
late, with the result that 50,000 people a year are forced to sell their homes to pay 
for care. This has led to the following question being asked: Why should people 
make sacrifices to pay off a mortgage if they are going to be penalised in this way, 
when those who did not bother to buy a home get their care costs paid by the state? 
Currently, annual care costs vary between £30,000-50,000 depending on the extent 
of nursing care required. The 2011 Dilnot Commission on Funding of Care and 
Support recommended that: the amount any individual should be required to 
contribute to the cost of their social care should be capped at between £25,000 and 
£50,000 (excluding normal room and board costs) and that the means-test threshold 
be increased to £100,000. The total cost to the Government was estimated to be 
£2.2bn.   
 
One in five of us will need care for an average of two years. This means that long-
term care is a classic insurance problem with a standard insurance solution. Above a 
certain minimum income level, individuals could be encouraged to take out long-
term care insurance, possibly by diverting some existing pension tax relief for this 
purpose. If we all did this at a young age, the annual premiums would be fairly 
modest. But there is a free rider problem to consider. If the scheme is voluntary, 
some people will choose not to participate, despite the tax relief, in the belief that 
since everyone else is covered, they will be able to slip through the net if they need 
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care which they might not. The young in particular are likely to believe that they will 
never need to draw on the insurance policy. There is a danger that sufficient 
numbers of people will not participate for these reasons. So compulsion might be 
the only effective way of dealing with the free rider problem, in which case again tax 
relief is not necessary. 
 
3. The net cost to HM Treasury of pension tax relief (tax relief on pension 
contributions, on investment income of pension funds and lump sum withdrawals 
less tax liable on pension payments) was £22.8bn in 2012-13.1069 It is impossible to 
tell from this figure whether it is consistent with tax neutrality over the life cycle, but 
we can say that we are not currently in a state of tax neutrality, since there has not 
so far been a year in which pension tax relief has not exceeded pension taxes. This 
might happen in the future as more baby boomers retire and if taxes exceed relief. 
But the taxes would have to exceed the relief by a substantial margin in the years 
ahead: the net tax relief between 2000-01 and 2009-10 alone was £168.7bn. A 
tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the current system does not lead to tax 
neutrality when aggregated over individual life cycles within one age cohort: the 
structure of tax reliefs is too generous compared with the taxes subsequently 
collected. Pension taxes could be reformed to rectify this. They could also be 
reformed to make post-retirement work more attractive (the Government’s decision 
in the 2012 Budget to remove the higher income tax thresholds for older people 
militates against this, however). 
 
4. If the Government wants to cap the total cost of tax relief, especially if the pension 
tax system is not neutral over the life cycle – a fact that benefits the better off – then 
one solution favouring greater equity is to make the system less generous for the 
better off. This can be done on both the contribution and benefit side. In terms of 
contributions, the Government has already severely capped the level of 
contributions which attract tax relief. It would not be sensible to reduce this cap any 
further, since this would greatly penalise people who do not start a pension scheme 
until late in their working life and hence need to make very high annual 
contributions to catch up. So a better way might be to remove higher rate tax relief 
on pension contributions and only allow tax relief at the basic rate or a new flat rate 
of, say, 33%.1070 In terms of benefits, the (currently tax-free) lump sum could be 
taxed above a certain level. A more extreme solution would be to remove the tax-
free lump sum altogether. This, of course, would be extremely unpopular. Also the 
lump sum plays an important role in providing a rainy day fund for people in 
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retirement: many people are not able to finance big ticket expenses, like boiler or car 
repairs, from their pensions. Nevertheless, while politically unpopular, the proposed 
reforms here would not only deal with equity issues, they would also help the 
system move closer to tax neutrality over individual life cycles. 
 
5. Finally, the issue of intergenerational equity: no generation is entitled to unfairly 
burden generations which do not yet have the vote or which have not yet been born. 
It is also unwise for them to try and do so, as these later generations can choose not 
to honour the obligations that have been placed upon them and which they have not 
agreed to. This becomes more likely if the later generations are smaller in size and 
poorer than the earlier generations, a possibility that seems increasingly likely in the 
UK and other parts of the developed world – unless there is mass immigration, a 
possibility which now seems equally likely. This reinforces the argument that the 
pension tax system should be tax neutral between generations and should not 
involve the tax liabilities of one generation being passed on to future generations.  
To summarise, the effectiveness of pension tax reforms in encouraging an optimal level of 
pension savings will largely depend on the balance between three types of individual: 
 Econs – reforms will not alter the behaviour of econs who have already optimally set 
up their pension schemes, regardless of the level of tax relief; indeed econs do not 
need any  tax relief to set up a pension scheme 
 Humans facing extreme behavioural barriers – no amount of tax relief is going to 
nudge such people into setting up and maintaining a pension scheme, so again there 
is no need for tax relief in this case. Making occupational pensions compulsory 
rather than voluntary is the clear solution here, but all Governments have shied 
away from this, afraid of the accusation that this would be another form of taxation.  
 Humans facing moderate behavioural barriers – here nudges in the form of tax relief 
will be effective.  However, the biggest beneficiaries of pension tax relief are always 
going to be higher income and better educated people, unless tax relief is genuinely 
made tax neutral over the life cycle through some combination of limits to the tax 
relief on contributions (such as restricting it to the basic rate or a new flat rate of 
33% which is probably less distortionary than increasing the cap on contributions) 
and increased taxes on benefits (such as taxing the lump sum above a certain limit).  
7.7 Recommendations 
Our discussion in this Chapter leads us to make the following five recommendations. 
Recommendation 7.1: Reviewing the working relationships within the pensions industry 
We recommend that the pensions industry – via its trade associations – conducts a review 
of the working relationships of its various components – providers, advisers, investment 
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managers and insurers – to remove the serious fissures and thinly disguised hostilities that 
currently exist, and which impede customers getting the best solutions for their needs.  
All these parties are necessary to provide appropriate, effective and value-for-money 
retirement income solutions, yet the evidence we have gathered for this report suggests 
that the working relationship between the parties is not working effectively in the best 
interests of customers. 
 
Recommendation 7.2: Creating a single pensions regulator 
We recommend that the Government creates a single pensions regulator, with the 
regulatory powers of the Financial Conduct Authority over contract-based schemes 
transferred to The Pensions Regulator. 
This would be consistent with the enhancement of the powers of independent governance 
committees in contract-based schemes to match those of the trustees in trust-based 
schemes proposed in Recommendation 3.6. It would also help to provide greater 
consistency of treatment between trust-based and contract-based schemes. Particularly 
important in this context is the issue compensation in the event of the insolvency of a 
pension scheme or a service provider to a scheme.  Our research shows that there are many 
serious and significant discrepancies between the compensation rules of trust-based and 
contract-based schemes. The creation of a single regulator would help to bring clarity and 
consistency to pension savers' rights and protections.   
 
Recommendation 7.3: Establishing a pension tax and tax relief framework that reflects 
how people behave 
We recommend that the Government establishes a pension tax and tax relief framework 
that encourages the optimal level of pension savings given the reality that most people 
are ‘humans’ not ‘econs’. 
The aims of the pension tax and tax relief framework would be: 
6. To encourage the level of pension savings needed to achieve a target standard of 
living in retirement which might be defined as: 
a) ‘essential’ – income sufficient to cover an individual’s minimum basic 
expenditure needs 
b) ‘adequate’ – income sufficient to achieve a minimum lifestyle to which an 
individual aspires in retirement 
c) ‘desired’ – income sufficient to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
individual aspires in retirement. 
584 
 
7. To encourage individuals to make provision for long-term care. (While this is not 
directly a pension issue, the relationship between the increases in longevity and 
morbidity inevitably link the two.) 
8. To achieve tax neutrality over the life cycle. One objective of pension tax relief is to 
encourage larger pension funds than otherwise, but to do so in a way that is tax 
neutral to each generational cohort, so that the cumulative value of tax reliefs during 
the accumulation phase broadly equals the present value of tax that will be collected 
during the decumulation phase (both valued at the date of retirement). 
9. To achieve a degree of equity between members of the same generation through a 
redistribution of resources between low- and high-income individuals, men and 
women etc. 
10. To achieve a degree of equity across generations and, in particular, to avoid unfair 
burdens falling on future generations. 
 
Recommendation 7.4: Establishing a permanent independent Pensions, Care and Savings 
Commission 
We recommend that the Government establishes a permanent independent Pensions, 
Care and Savings Commission which reports to Parliament.   
Its remit would be: 
 To assess the impact of the Budget flexibilities on default investment strategies  
 To consider whether a default decumulation option is required for savers making 
poor decisions 
 To assess the impact of the reforms on the suitability and accessibility of retirement 
products 
 To recommend market interventions where the market was not working in savers’ 
best interest 
 To tackle high charges and poor governance in legacy schemes 
 To review auto-enrolment, including making recommendations on minimum 
contributions and defining adequacy of retirement income and how the policy 
should be assessed as a success. The committee said using opt-out rates to measure 
success would not be meaningful in the long term 
 To oversee any further changes in savings and tax policy 
 To assess the minimum age at which people can exercise their pension flexibilities. 
The current age is 55 and this will rise to 57 in 2028 when the state pension age 
increases to 67. But allowing people to draw on the private pension ten years before 
state pension age could create unrealistic expectations about the age at which they 
can afford to stop working. The commission  would consider whether this should be 
reduced to five years, except for those in ill health 
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 To look at issues relating to auto-enrolment: the challenges of extending auto-
enrolment to smaller employers, the level of minimum contributions for employers 
and employees, how currently excluded groups, such as the self-employed and those 
in multiple low-paid jobs, can be brought into pension saving more effectively 
 To review the structure of state pensions and the Government’s timetable for raising 
the state retirement age to reflect both improvements in life-spans and overall 
financial costs to the taxpayer (given the current commitment to the ‘triple lock’ 
indexation of the basic state pension)  
 To advise every three years on the need or not for a general increase in retirement 
age to reflect increases in longevity so as to keep pension funding costs broadly 
stable over the long-term where scheme specific information is unavailable  
 To recommend policies designed to encourage more employers and employees to 
invest in retirement income plans, including auto-escalation and other measures to 
maximise design flexibilities and choices, advising on financial and tax incentives to 
encourage wider coverage, whilst taking account of the UK economic, demographic 
and financial backcloth and life-style changes  
 To review and make recommendations on tax incentives for long-term care products  
 To promote legislative and regulatory simplification to encourage quality provision, 
accepting that legislation must continue to protect members’ retirement incomes 
from the impact of employer or provider insolvency or default  
 At the request of Government, to review on a periodic basis the structure and rules 
of the NEST scheme to ensure employees are offered an appropriate fall-back 
retirement income plan where no better scheme is offered by a sponsoring 
employer  
 To ensure that over the long-term, the cost of public sector pensions, and those that 
are largely funded by the taxpayer, are transparent in cost to the taxpayer, are 
sustainable and are fair set against the scale of private provision available to the 
majority of taxpayers  
 To report on matters referred by Government to the Commission on an ad hoc basis 
and also on European directives that could have an impact on any of the above 
 To conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed pension reforms 
 To investigate whether the Government should be recommended to introduce 
products such as longevity bonds or deferred annuities to help hedge longevity risk 
 To examine the issue of inter-generational equity. For too long Governments have 
kicked this can down the road. Eventually they will run out of road, and this could 
happen sooner than we all think. 
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Recommendation 7.5: Adopting a national retirement savings target of 15% of lifetime 
earnings 
We recommend that the Government adopts a national retirement savings target of 15% 
of lifetime earnings, achieved through auto-escalation, to avoid future pensioner poverty. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
The unifying thread that runs through funded pension scheme is the requirement to 
annuitise enough pension wealth, at the appropriate age, to provide an adequate lifelong 
income in retirement when combined with the state pension – which is the rationale for 
establishing a private-sector pension scheme in the first place. It is this requirement which 
makes a funded pension scheme different from any other type of savings scheme.  
When annuitisation becomes optional, that unifying thread is no longer present and there is 
a real danger that the pension system begins to unravel. At best, it just becomes a tax-
favoured arrangement for operating a multi-purpose spending pot and once the money has 
been spent for one purpose, it cannot be spent on another. At worst, it becomes a honey 
pot for thieves and other opportunists: while you cannot steal someone’s pension, you can 
steal their pension pot, as a number of people are now discovering. Lying between these 
extremes are millions of people who are now in control of their pension fund and who will 
be trying to do the best for themselves and their families. But for anyone who understands 
the risks in Table 1.2, many of these people could well find themselves in the same kind of 
control as a yachtsman in the middle of the Atlantic in a force nine gale. 
A great deal of effort will now have go into re-establishing what a good pension scheme is, 
as outlined in Table 1.1. This will need a commonly agreed national narrative. If we do not 
achieve this, we could end up in the position where people’s aversion to annuitisation 
combined with their willingness to pay highly for both flexibility and guarantees in 
drawdown products leaves many of them not much better off and possibly worse off than if 
they purchased an annuity to begin with. In other words, the behavioural bias against 
annuities could be used by the pensions industry to extract as much if not more from a 
customer than a 'terrible poor value' annuity. 
And to establish a national narrative that builds a consensus around retirement income will 
need the support of all the king’s horses, all the king’s men – and all the king’s women. This 
is a significant challenge. But it is one that is well worth the effort because ‘pensions ARE 
precious’.1071 
                                                     
1071 Ros Altmann, Pensions Minister, quoted in in Jenna Towler (2015) Pension fraud 'increasingly linked' to 
investment scams, Professional Adviser, 7 August. 
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The key elements of a national narrative 
 The primary purpose of a pension scheme is to provide an income in retirement for 
however long the scheme member lives – that is, it will not run out of money before 
the member dies. 
 A pension scheme needs to offer accessibility, inflation protection (either directly or 
via investment performance) and longevity insurance. 
 A pension scheme needs to provide value for money with the benefits clearly and 
transparently exceeding the costs. 
 Individuals should not be expected to manage the risks involved in the generation of 
retirement income from pension savings themselves. 
 Middle Britain – with pension assets between £30,000 and £100,000 – should be 
recommended to use a retirement income plan that involves a simple decision tree 
with a limited set of pathways. 
 The retirement income plan would be self-started following a guidance or advice 
surgery. 
 The plan member would choose from a set of safe harbour products approved by the 
regulator. The purpose of the decision tree is to identify the products that are most 
suitable for meeting the plan member’s needs. The aim is to achieve a simple 
solution that is appropriate (i.e., ‘good enough’) for those who do not wish to make 
any financial decisions themselves. 
 The safe harbour products would include annuities, drawdown products and 
longevity insurance that meet minimum design standards in terms of efficacy and 
deliver clear value for money. 
 The plan member would have flexible access to the pension pot until the point that 
longevity insurance kicks in. 
 A national narrative requires the integration of the accumulation and decumulation 
phases. An essential part of this narrative is ‘an adequate pension needs adequate 
contributions’. To have an adequate pension in retirement, Middle Britain, needs to 
understand that – together with the employer – it has to save 15% of its lifetime 
earnings in a pension scheme. 
 A parallel narrative is required to address the needs of the millions of private-sector 
workers who are self-employed or whose contracts of employment exclude them 
from auto-enrolment. 
 
 
588 
 
Appendix: The Professional Pensions guide to how pensions tax relief restrictions have 
developed since A-Day in 2006.1072  
 
Pension tax allowances since 2006 
 
Tax Year Annual Allowance (£) Lifetime Allowance (£) 
2006-07 215,000 1,500,000 
2007-08 225,000 1,600,000 
2008-09 235,000 1,650,000 
2009-10 245,000 1,750,000 
2010-11 255,000 1,800,000 
2011-12 50,000 1,800,000 
2012-13 50,000 1,500,000 
2013-14 50,000 1,500,000 
2014-15 40,000 1,250,000 
2015-16 40,000 1,250,000 
2016-17 40,000 1,000,000* 
* Indexed to CPI from April 2018 
 
Budget 2009 
The first major tax relief restrictions since A-Day in April 2006 began with Alistair Darling's 
2009 Budget, when he announced he would restrict higher-rate tax relief on pension 
contributions for people with incomes over £150,000. 
Restrictions had previously been governed by the A-Day reforms, which gave an absolute 
lifetime allowance of £1.75m and an annual allowance of £245,000 (limits for the 2009/2010 
tax year). 
In his 2009 Budget, Darling said that, from 2011 and for incomes above the £150,000 level, 
the value of pensions tax relief would be tapered down until it is 20% for those on incomes 
over £180,000 - making it worth the same for each pound of contribution to pension 
entitlement as for a basic rate income tax payer. 
In addition, Darling said that, in anticipation of this change, he was also introducing 
legislation to prevent individuals taking advantage of the pensions tax relief while it is still 
                                                     
1072
 Jonathan Stapleton (2015) How pensions tax relief has been slashed since 2006, Professional Pensions, 17 
March;  
http://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2162378/budget-2012-guide-tax-relief-
restrictions 
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available to them at a higher rate - and making substantial additional pension contributions 
prior to the restriction taking effect. 
Darling said: ‘It is difficult to justify how a quarter of all the money the country spends on 
pensions tax relief goes, as now, to the top 1.5% of pension savers’. 
Pre-Budget Report 2009 
In his pre-budget report of December 2009, Darling announced higher-rate tax relief 
restrictions - originally announced in the April 2009 budget - would now include employer 
contributions and affect those with relevant income of £130,000 and over rather than the 
previously announced figure of £150,000 and over. 
This would have effectively meant anyone with income of £130,000 or more would not 
receive higher-rate tax relief on their contributions. 
It was believed as many as 150,000 people could be caught out by this extension of higher-
rate tax relief restrictions. 
A statement by HM Treasury at the time confirmed: "From April 2011 tax relief on pension 
contributions will be restricted for individuals with gross incomes of £150,000 and over, 
where gross income incorporates all pension contributions, including the value of any 
benefit funded by, or eventually funded by, an individual's employer. 
‘Tax relief will gradually be tapered away so that above £180,000 it is worth 20%, the same 
rate received by a basic-rate income taxpayer. To provide more certainty for individuals 
around whether they are affected, and to reduce administrative burdens for schemes, this 
will be subject to an income floor at £130,000 of pre-tax income (excluding the value of any 
employer pension contributions)’. 
Budget 2010 
In what would be his last Budget, Darling rejected industry pleas to change the way it was 
going to implement pensions tax relief restrictions. 
Darling confirmed: ‘Tax relief on pensions will be restricted but only for those earning 
£130,000 a year’. 
HM Treasury also published a summary of the responses it received on its consultation on 
implementing the restriction of pensions tax relief - and outlined the Government's 
response and the next steps for developing the restriction ahead of its proposed 
introduction in April 2011. 
But it rejected pleas from the pensions industry to reduce the annual or lifetime allowance 
instead - saying such a move would hit lower earners. 
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It said: "A reduction in the annual or lifetime allowance would potentially apply to pension 
savers with much lower incomes, particularly in DB schemes. Furthermore, it would allow 
high-income individuals to continue to benefit from a higher rate of tax relief than other 
pension savers. 
‘In addition, alternative options could not be implemented fairly without making significant 
adjustments to the pensions tax system that would also add their own complexity’. 
It continued: ‘The Government does not propose any changes to the annual allowance or 
the lifetime allowance at this stage’. 
And the Treasury remained adamant that restricting tax relief was the right thing to do. 
It said: ‘The Government remains clear that the restriction of pensions tax relief is 
proportionate and necessary, and many stakeholders agreed that action to restrict the 
amount of relief going to those on the highest incomes is appropriate. 
‘The measure also represents an important part of the Government's consolidation of the 
public finances. In restricting relief on pension contributions, the Government's objectives 
are to rebalance the pensions tax system to ensure that pensions tax relief remains 
affordable, and to address the disproportionate levels of relief going to those on the highest 
incomes, around 2% of pension savers’. 
The Budget also announced further decisions on how the restriction of relief would be 
applied and delivered - noting that deemed contributions to defined benefit pension 
schemes will be valued using the age-related factors method. 
And it said the restrictions would primarily be delivered through self assessment - noting tax 
returns would be modified to report additional information to HMRC and to calculate the 
restriction of pensions tax relief. 
It said, where individuals are affected, HMRC will collect a recovery charge reflecting the 
restriction of relief through self-assessment. 
A cost-benefit analysis, published at the time of the Budget, revealed that HM Treasury had 
trebled its estimate of the one-off costs that pension schemes, employers and individuals 
would incur as a result of the tax on higher earners' pension contributions. 
The new impact assessment said the one-off costs incurred during the transition to the new 
regime will total £900m - or around £3000 for each of the 300,000 taxpayers affected - 
compared with the £305m estimate published in December. 
The increase is particularly pronounced for employers, whose one-off costs are now 
expected to be £330m rather than £40m. Annual costs are now expected to be £115m, 
rather than £90m. 
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Emergency Budget 2010 
In his Emergency Budget - held just after the coalition Government came to power - 
Chancellor George Osborne announced he would work with the pensions industry on 
‘alternative ways’ to implement pension tax relief restrictions - and was considering 
reducing the annual allowance to as little as £30,000. 
Osborne said: ‘Many businesses are alarmed at complexity. I have listened to those 
concerns, however, I must also protect £3.5bn revenue it would create. 
‘I will work with industry on raising same amount of revenue - potentially by reducing the 
annual allowance’. 
In a Treasury document - published alongside the Budget - the Government said ‘provisional 
analysis suggested an annual allowance in the region of £30,000 - £45,000 might deliver the 
necessary yield’. 
The document also confirmed the Government has ‘reservations’ about the approach 
adopted in Finance Act 2010 - saying it could have ‘unwelcome consequences for pension 
saving, bring significant complexity to the tax system, and damage UK business and 
competitiveness’. 
It said the Government wanted to engage employers, pension schemes, experts and other 
interested parties to determine the best design of a regime - looking at a wide range of 
issues that will need further consideration. 
National Association of Pension Funds chief executive Joanne Segars feared the proposals as 
they stood would cost between £2.5bn to £3bn to implement and lead to senior corporate 
decision-makers disengaging from workplace pensions, eroding employer interest in the 
schemes. 
The trade body suggested reducing the amount of pension contribution eligible for tax relief 
from £255,000 to about £50,000, which will limit the tax relief available to high earners, but 
in a way less harmful to pension provision. 
‘This will be less damaging to pension saving and cost far less to implement’, Segars said. 
Treasury announcement - October 2010 
In October 2010, the Treasury confirmed the annual allowance would be cut from £255,000 
to £50,000; the lifetime allowance reduced from £1.8m to £1.5m, and the factor for valuing 
final salary benefits increased from 10 to 16. 
It said this would replace the ‘complex proposal’ legislated for by the Labour Government. 
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The Treasury said the measure would raise £4bn a year - but would be targeted at those 
who make the most significant pension savings 
It said these new allowances will for the time being be frozen - with options for indexing to 
be considered from 2015-16. 
Pension benefits for deferred pensioners will be exempt from the annual allowance regime. 
The Treasury estimated the changes would affect 100,000 pension savers - 80% of those will 
have incomes of more than £100,000. 
However, the Government said it was committed to protecting individuals on low and 
moderate incomes as far as possible. 
It said to protect individuals who exceed the annual allowance due to one-off "spike" in 
accrual, the Government would allow individuals to offset this against unused allowance 
from the previous three tax years. 
The Treasury said it would also introduce a CPI exemption - which would mean only pay 
rises in excess of CPI inflation would be taken into account for final salary benefit 
calculations. 
In addition, it said it would consult on options enabling people to meet tax charges out of 
their pensions. 
The Treasury said in order to protect the public finances it was necessary to introduce the 
reduced annual allowance from April 2011. The Government said it planned to introduce 
the reduction in the lifetime allowance from April 2012. 
Financial secretary to the Treasury Mark Hoban said: ‘We have abandoned the previous 
Government's complex proposals and developed a solution that will help to tackle the 
deficit but not hit those on low and moderate incomes. We have taken a tough but fair 
decision. 
‘The coalition Government believes that our system is fair, will preserve incentives to save 
and - compared to the last Government's approach - will help UK businesses to attract and 
retain talent’. 
Budget 2011 
In his 2011 Budget, Osborne confirmed the planned £50,000 annual allowance for tax free 
pension contributions. 
It confirmed the move, first announced on 14 October, last year would come into force from 
6 April 2011 
The document also confirmed the lifetime allowance would be £1.5m. 
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Budget 2012 
In the run-up to the the 2012 Budget, a cut to the annual allowance emerged as the ‘strong 
favourite’ to be announced by the Chancellor. 
The Liberal Democrats had been calling publicly for cuts to higher-rate tax relief to fund a 
hike in the income tax threshold to £10,000. 
At the time it was said three options were on the table: a cut in the higher-rate tax relief 
from 40% to 20%, a further reduction in the annual allowance or changes to the size of the 
tax free lump sum available on retirement. 
Industry commentators believed it was ‘75% likely’ a cut in annual allowance would be 
included in the Budget but hoped the Government would leave tax relief ‘alone entirely’. 
In the end, the Government decided to make no further changes to tax relief. 
Autumn Statement 2012 
Chancellor George Osborne announced he would cut the annual allowance from £50,000 to 
£40,000 and reduce the lifetime allowance from £1.5m to £1.25m from the 2014/15 tax 
year. 
The Chancellor said the cut to the tax-free allowance would save the Treasury £1bn a year 
by 2017/18. 
He said 98% of the population have less than a £1.25m pension pot and noted the median 
pot in the UK was £55,000 with 99% of savers' annual contributions less than 40,000. 
Osborne said the average annual contribution was less than £6,000. 
The Autumn Statement said that in 2010-11, tax relief for pension savings cost the 
Government around £33bn - with over half of this relief going to higher rate taxpayers. 
And it said, even with changes made to reduce the cost of pensions tax relief, the 
Government was still likely to forgo around £31bn in tax revenues this year, rising to £35bn 
in 2015-16. 
Budget 2013 
The Government has confirmed it would end tax relief on contributions to schemes set up 
for employees' spouses or families as part of a clampdown on avoidance. 
HM Treasury revealed in the budget that it would include legislation on the practice in the 
Finance Bill 2013. 
It said: ‘As announced at Budget 2012, legislation will be included in Finance Bill 2013 to 
remove the tax and NICs incentives for employees and employers respectively from 
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arrangements where an employer pays a pension contribution into a registered pension 
scheme for an employee's spouse or family member as part of their employee's flexible 
remuneration package’. 
Autumn Statement 2013 
The Chancellor announced he would abolish the 55% tax charge levied on beneficiaries of 
individuals who die under the age of 75 with a joint life or guaranteed term annuity. 
In a widely anticipated move, the Government said beneficiaries would be able to receive 
any future payments from such policies tax free where no payments have been made to the 
beneficiary before 6 April 2015. 
It said the tax rules would also be changed to allow joint life annuities to be paid to any 
beneficiary. 
If the annuitant dies after the age of 75 then the beneficiary will pay the marginal rate of  
income tax, or 45% if the funds are taken as a lump sum payment. Lump sum payments will 
be charged at the beneficiary's marginal rate from 2016-17. 
The announcement will bring tax treatment for annuities in line with income drawdown. 
The original proposals would have weighted the decision-making in favour of the riskier - 
but more flexible - income drawdown option. 
Budget 2014 
The Government announced it would scrap restrictions on how people take pensions 
income as part of a radical overhaul of tax relief. 
From 27 March 2014, the Government said it would slash the minimum income 
requirement for retirees entering flexible drawdown from £20,000 to £12,000 and raise 
maximum GAD limits for those in capped drawdown from 120% to 150%. 
In a widely anticipated move Osborne also raised trivial commutation limits from £2,000 to 
£10,000 and the trivial commutation lump sum limit will increase from £18,000 to £30,000. 
However the Government said it planned to be even more radical - saying that from April 
2015 it would allow anyone over the age of 55 to take their entire pensions pot as cash, 
subject to their marginal rate of income tax in that year. 
The Government also said it would raise the age at which an individual could take their 
pension savings under the tax rules from 55 to 57 in 2028. 
And said it would offer all DC scheme members access to free and impartial face-to-face 
guidance on the range of options available to them at retirement. 
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Delivering the changes Osborne said: ‘We will legislate to remove all remaining tax 
restrictions on how pensioners have access to their pension pots. Pensioners will have 
complete freedom to draw down as much or as little of their pension pot as they want, 
anytime they want. No caps. No drawdown limits. Let me be clear. No one will have to buy 
an annuity’. 
Budget documents revealed the move would increase tax income by £1.2bn a year by 2019. 
The Government estimated the move would raise £320m in 2015/16, £600m in 2016/17; 
£910m in 2017/18 and £1.2bn in 2018/19. 
Budget 2015 
Chancellor George Osborne confirmed the lifetime allowance would be reduced from 
£1.25m to £1m from the 2016-17 tax year, netting the Treasury an extra £600m a year. 
But he said he would index the lifetime allowance from the 2018-19 tax year - and also ruled 
out making any further change to the annual allowance. 
Delivering the Budget, Osborne said: ‘From next year, we will further reduce the lifetime 
allowance from £1.25m to £1m. This will save around £600m a year. Fewer than 4% of 
pension savers currently approaching retirement will be affected. 
‘However, I want to ensure those still building up their pension pots are protected from 
inflation so from 2018 we will index the lifetime allowance’. 
This comes after Labour leader Ed Miliband revealed his party would cut the lifetime and 
annual allowances in an effort to reduce university tuition fees if it wins the general 
election. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
